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The first essay of this dissertation investigates the effect of macroeconomic 
fluctuations at school-leaving on men’s health at age 40.  I use macroeconomic 
fluctuations in the U.S. between 1976 and 1992 as a quasi-experiment to identify 
persistent health effects.  I proxy macroeconomic fluctuations with the state 
unemployment rate.  I draw data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 
1979 Cohort (NLSY79) Age 40 Health supplement.  I examine three measures of 
health: physical and mental functioning and depressive symptoms.  I find that men 
who leave school when the state unemployment rate is high have worse physical and 
mental health functioning, and more depressive symptoms at age 40 than men who left 
school when the state unemployment rate was low.   
The second essay tests the persistent effect of macroeconomic fluctuations at 
leaving school on three markers of health behavior: smoking, binge drinking, and 
obesity.   Data are drawn from the NLSY79.  I exploit macroeconomic fluctuations at 
school leaving between 1976 and 1995 to identify effects.  I proxy macroeconomic 
fluctuations with the state unemployment rate.  I find that leaving school when the 
state unemployment rate is high leads to an increase in the probability of binge 
drinking and a decrease in the probability of obesity in middle age.  Health behavior 
marker effects are concentrated among college educated men.   
 The third essay contributes to the literature on the labor market consequences 
of unhealthy behaviors by examining a previously underappreciated consequence of 
the rise in obesity in the U.S.: challenges for military recruitment.  Specifically, this 
essay estimates the percent of the U.S. military-age population that exceeds the 
Army’s current active duty enlistment standards for weight-for-height and percent 
body fat, using data from the full series of National Health and Nutrition Examination 
Surveys (1959-2008).  This essay documents a substantial increase in the number and 
percent of military-age civilians who are ineligible to serve in the Army because they 
are overweight, finds disparities across race and education in exceeding the standards, 
and estimates the implications for military recruitment of future changes in the 
prevalence of obesity.   
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF LEAVING SCHOOL IN A BAD ECONOMY 
 
Johanna Catherine Maclean1 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study investigates the effect of leaving school in a bad economy, defined as a 
state unemployment rate of 9% or higher, on men’s health at age 40.  Three empirical 
patterns motivate this research: workers who leave school in a bad economy 
persistently earn lower wages and work in less prestigious careers, individuals’ career 
outcomes are associated with health outcomes, and the macroeconomy affects health.  
I use macroeconomic fluctuations between 1976 and 1992, and variation across states, 
as a quasi-experiment to identify the persistent health effects.  Three health outcomes 
are examined: physical functioning, mental functioning, and depressive symptoms.  I 
draw data from the recently available National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
Cohort Age 40 Health supplement.  I find that men who leave school in a bad 
economy have worse health at age 40 than men who leave school in a stronger 
economy.  The results are robust to various econometric specifications, including the 
use of instrumental variables to correct for the potential endogeneity of the timing and 
location of leaving school.  Supplementary analysis sheds light on potential 
mechanisms.  Factor analysis indicates that effects are concentrated in mental health 
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domains.  This study provides the first published evidence on the persistent health 
effects of leaving school in a bad economy. The findings suggest that men who left 
school during the 2007-09 recession may experience persistently poor careers and 
health.  
 
I. Introduction 
This study investigates the persistent health effects of leaving school in a bad 
economy, defined as a state unemployment rate of 9% or higher.  I compare the age 40 
health of men who left school in a bad economy with the age 40 health of men who 
did not.  Three empirical patterns motivate this study: leaving school in a bad 
economy has persistent and negative career effects; individual’s career and health 
outcomes are correlated; and macroeconomic fluctuations affect health.  My findings 
are timely as the U.S. is recovering from the 2007-09 recession.  Figure 1.1 plots the 
national unemployment rate between 1950 and 2010.  The high and persistent 
unemployment rates of the 2007-09 recession are apparent.  The national 
unemployment rate was 8.2% in March 2012; this translates into 12.8 million 
unemployed persons (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], 2012).  42.6% of the 
unemployed can be categorized as in long term unemployment, defined as an 
unemployment spell lasting 27 weeks or more.  The rate of unemployment is 
particularly high among new labor market entrants: 13.8%, among those aged 20-24 
(BLS, 2012).  Rates of underemployment are estimated to be as high as 14.9% (BLS, 
2012).  Underemployment includes workers in part time jobs for economic reasons, 
discouraged workers, and persons marginally attached to the labor market.  Research 
3 
shows that new labor market entrants have suffered disproportionately in terms of 
employment outcomes in the 2007-09 recession (Bell & Blanchflower, 2009).  
Research implies the 2007-09 recession led to stress, food insecurity, morbidity, 
sedentary lifestyles, lower use of medical services, and loss of health insurance 
(Lusardi et al, 2010; Nord et al, 2009; Cawley et al, 2011; Colman & Dave, 2011; 
Currie & Telkin, 2011; Deaton, 2011; Holahan, 2011).  These statistics imply that the 
current cohort of school-leavers may experience persistent, negative career and health 
effects as a result of entering a fragile labor market. 
FIGURE 1.1. National unemployment rate: 1950-2010 
Early 1980s recession
Late 2000s recession
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3
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Mean UE=5.7%
 
Notes: Data are drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Historical Unemployment Rate 
data series (series number LNS14000000).  The early 1980s recession (July 1981-
November 1982) is indicated with dashed lines and the late 2000s recession (December 
2007- June 2009) is indicated with dotted lines.   
 
Previous literature suggests that the link between leaving school in a bad 
economy and age 40 health may operate, at least partially, through career, marriage, 
4 
and education outcomes.  Leaving school in a bad economy leads to a higher 
probability of unemployment and a low-quality job (e.g., lower wage, less satisfying, 
less likely to offer health-related benefits, more harmful work environment) in the 
short run as there are few open jobs from which to choose.  Labor studies show that 
labor market frictions limit the ability of workers to shift into better jobs as the 
economy rebounds, leaving workers persistently stuck in low-wage and low-quality 
jobs (e.g., Oyer 2006; 2008; Mansour, 2009; Genda et al, 2010; Kahn, 2010; Schoar & 
Zuo, 2011; Oreopolous et al, 2012).  I employ a broad definition of labor market 
frictions: any deviation from perfect worker mobility between jobs.  In a spot market 
only contemporary shocks affect career outcomes while frictions (e.g., imperfect 
information, signaling, implicit contracts, internal labor markets, human capital 
accumulation) suggest that leaving school when the state unemployment rate is high 
may persistently affect outcomes.  See Baker et al (1994), Oyer (2006; 2008), or Kahn 
(2010) for a comprehensive review of labor market frictions.  The career effects are 
economically meaningful.  Kahn (2010), using the same data set that I analyze in this 
study, finds that among white male college graduates a 1 percentage point increase in 
the state unemployment rate at school-leaving is associated with an annual wage loss 
of 2.5-9% and a less prestigious career 15 years later.  A robust health economics 
literature shows that income is positively associated with health; job attributes 
(benefits, satisfaction, hours worked, working conditions) affect health after 
conditioning on income; and job loss/unemployment negatively affects health beyond 
what is predicted by standard income effects.  Additionally, leaving school in a bad 
5 
economy may affect marriage and education by altering marriage market opportunities 
or the opportunity cost of attaining additional education.   
I draw data from the recently available, geocoded National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort (NLSY79) Age 40 Health supplement.  The supplement 
is well-suited to my research objectives: it contains rich information on age 40 health, 
detailed educational and labor market histories, and comprehensive background 
information.  I model age 40 health outcomes as a function of leaving school in a bad 
economy and use macroeconomic fluctuations between 1976 and 1992 as a quasi-
experiment to identify health effects.  The early 1980s recession lies in the middle of 
this period (July 1982-November 1983).  My findings are may be informative to 
current policy makers because the early 1980s is arguably the most similar economic 
event in recent history to the 2007-09 recession.   
My results suggest that men who leave school in a bad economy have worse 
health, particularly mental health, at age 40 than men who do not.  The magnitude of 
the estimated effects is similar in absolute value to having a mother with a high school 
diploma relative to a mother who dropped out of high school.  The results are robust to 
various econometric specifications, including the use of instrumental variables to 
correct for the potential endogeneity of the timing and location of leaving school.  
Health effects vary by race/ethnicity, family background, occupation, and skill.  I 
identify career, marriage, fertility, education, and self-esteem outcomes as potential 
mechanisms.   
This study contributes to several economic literatures.  First, it adds to the 
labor literature on the effects of leaving school in a bad economy (e.g., Oyer, 2006; 
6 
Kahn, 2010; Oreopolous et al, 2012), as it identifies a previously unrecognized 
consequence: health.  Second, it relates to the robust economics literature that 
documents the health effects of career outcomes (Duleep, 1986; Fletcher et al, 2010).  
Third, this study extends the active, although mixed, line of research that examines the 
health effects of macroeconomic fluctuations (Ruhm, 2000; Miller et al, 2009; Huff 
Stevens et al, 2011; Davalos et al, forthcoming).  Fourth, this paper contributes to the 
growing interest in sensitive developmental periods (Heckman, 2007; Almond & 
Currie, 2011): neuroscience research documents that school-leaving age is an 
important period for emotional development (Dahl, 2004).  While the literature has 
largely ignored the potential health effects of leaving school in a bad economy, it does 
suggest that a relationship may exist.  
This paper is structured as follows.  Section II reviews channels from leaving 
school in a bad economy to later health.  Data and measures are described in Section 
III; Section IV reports the empirical model and results.  Robustness checks are 
reported in Section V and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Conceptual Framework 
Leaving school in a bad economy may have a persistent negative effect on 
health through several channels.  Workers who leave school in a bad economy earn 
less than workers who do not.  Empirical health studies document a positive 
association between income and health (Duleep, 1986; Deaton & Paxson, 1998; 
Deaton, 2002; Gardner & Oswald, 2007; Currie, 2009).  Job displacement is 
associated with income loses, morbidity, unhealthy behaviors, suicide, and mortality 
7 
(Jacobson et al, 1993; Eliason & Storrie, 2009; Kuhn et al, 2009; Strully, 2009; 
Sullivan & von Wachter, 2009; Classen & Dunn, 2012; Davis & von Wachter, 2011; 
Deb et al, 2011).  Job churning is correlated with poor health (Strully, 2009), workers 
with past unemployment spells have worse mental health than continuously employed 
workers (Knabe & Ratzel, 2009), and the unemployed have particularly poor health 
(Dooley et al, 1996).  If mental health declines in bad economies (Ruhm, 2000), 
workers may be less productive and receive a low wage regardless of the number of 
jobs available (Ettner et al, 1997).   
Low-quality jobs may lack benefits and provide unhealthy working conditions 
because working conditions are correlated within jobs (Kenkel & Supina, 1992).  
Workers who leave school in a bad economy work in less prestigious careers and are 
less likely to be promoted (Oyer, 2006; 2008; Kwon et al, 2010; Kahn, 2010).  In the 
U.S. health insurance is highly tied to employment.  If men who leave school in a bad 
economy systematically lack access to health insurance, they may experience health 
losses (Franks et al, 1993; Currie & Gruber, 1996).  Unsafe and unpredictable work is 
linked with worse health, and cumulative exposure may be particularly harmful 
(Fletcher et al, 2007; Fletcher & Yamaguchi, 2010).  Long work hours are associated 
with obesity (Courtemanche, 2009), repetitive tasks and work overload are correlated 
with sleep problems (Knudsen et al, 2007), and job satisfaction is associated with 
reporting good health (Fischer & Sousa-Poza, 2009).   
Leaving school in a bad economy may affect health through marriage, fertility, 
and education.  These outcomes are associated with good health (Grossman, 1972; 
Gardner & Oswald, 2004; Fuchs, 2004; Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2008).  Marriage and 
8 
fertility decisions may be postponed or a worker may choose not to enter into these 
family arrangements.  For example, a man who leaves school in a bad economy and 
obtains a low paying job may have poor marriage market opportunities.  He may 
decide to delay or forego marriage and/or fertility.  Similarly, workers who leave 
school in a bad economy may seek out education as lower wages reduce opportunity 
costs or alternatively they may be unable to finance education with lower earnings.  
Additionally, psychological research associates unmet expectations with poor health 
(Aron & Aron, 1987).  If men who leave school in a bad economy are unable to 
achieve expectations they may experience poor health.    
Health shocks received during the school-leaving period may have persistent 
effects absent labor market frictions.  Economists are increasingly interested in 
sensitive periods of development: some skills or traits are most easily acquired at 
specific stages (Heckman, 2007).  Although much of this line of research has focused 
on early childhood (Almond & Currie, 2011), neuroscience research shows that typical 
school-leaving age (late-teens to mid-20s) is an important period for prefrontal cortex 
development.  This region of the brain governs emotion and self-regulation (Dahl, 
2004).2   
Several surprising studies call to question whether leaving school in a bad 
economy will hurt health.  Work by Ruhm (1995; 2000; 2003; 2005) and others (e.g., 
Dehejia & Lleras-Muney, 2004; Dave & Rashad-Kelly, 2010) shows that physical 
health and health behaviors improve while mortality declines as the unemployment 
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rate rises.  Several studies that use the Social Security Notch, Earned Income Tax 
Credit, or inheritances as exogenous sources of variation in income show no, or a 
negative, relationship between income and health (Snyder & Evans, 2006; Schmeiser, 
2009; Cawley et al, 2010; Kim & Ruhm, 2012).  The RAND health insurance 
experiment, a large-scale experiment than randomized levels of health insurance 
across individuals, finds that large differences in co-payments lead to small 
differences in health outcomes (Newhouse, 1993).  Recent quasi-experimental studies 
challenge the causal role of education in health production that is predicted by the 
Grossman model (Grossman, 1972; Albouy & Lequien, 2009; Clark & Royer, 2010; 
McCary & Royer, 2011).  Taken together, these unexpected findings imply that 
leaving school in a bad economy may have no effect, or a positive effect, on later 
health.  Thus, whether, or by how much, leaving school in a bad economy hurts health 
is an empirical question.   
 
III. Empirical Model and Data 
This study takes a standard health production function as a starting point 
(Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1983).  Health is produced using market (e.g., medical care) 
and non-market (e.g., exercise) inputs.  Consumers are endowed with a health stock 
and value health and other goods.  They make consumption decisions to maximize 
utility given preferences, prices, the budget set, and the health production function.  I 
choose covariates to proxy for these factors.  Recently, economists have extended the 
Rosenzweig & Schultz (1983) framework by building in sensitive developmental 
periods: health shocks received during such periods persistently affect health 
10 
(Heckman, 2007; Almond & Currie, 2011).  These extensions capture the 
developmental importance of school-leaving age (Dahl, 2004).  Features of these 
models provide my conceptual framework and guide my empirical analysis.   
I take a reduced form approach rather than estimate a full structural model that 
specifies all causal pathways from leaving school in a bad economy to health at age 
40.  I exploit a quasi-experiment, macroeconomic fluctuations between 1976 and 1992 
and variation across states, to identify net health effects.  My primary objective is to 
estimate the total effect of leaving school in a bad economy on health, not the partial 
effect after conditioning on career outcomes, marital status, and other endogenous 
health determinants.  In the core models, I control only for exogenous and 
predetermined variables.  One interpretation of the parameter estimates is the health 
effect after men make endogenous decisions about employment, marriage, and other 
health determinants.  In a later section I investigate potential mechanisms to shed light 
on how the net relationship may operate.   
I estimate the following health production to model age 40 health as a function 
of leaving school in a bad economy: 
H_40is = α0 + α1Uis + Xisα2 + Siα3 + Diα4 + εis (1) 
H_40is  is an age 40 health outcome for individual i in school-leaving state s.  
The key explanatory is Uis, an indicator for leaving school in a bad economy.  I 
compare the age 40 health of men who left school in a bad economy with the age 40 
health of men who did not.  Xis is a vector of personal characteristics for individual i in 
school-leaving state s.  Si and Di are school-leaving state and year fixed effects.  εis is 
the error term.  Inclusion of school-leaving state fixed effects implies that within 
11 
school-leaving state variation in unemployment rates is used to identify health effects 
while school-leaving year fixed effects capture national trends in the macroeconomy.  
The key identifying assumption is presented in Equation (2): 
Cov(Uis,εis|Xis,Si,Di)=0 (2) 
In words, the bad economy indicator is uncorrelated with the error term after 
conditioning on personal characteristics and various fixed effects.  Equations are 
estimated with least squares. 3  For interpretation I take log transformations of the 
functioning scales, parameter estimates have the interpretation of demi-elasticities.  
Results are robust if I use the raw scales.  I use sample weights that account for survey 
design and attrition, and I cluster standard errors by the school-leaving state.4   
I draw data from the recently available, geocoded National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort Age 40 Health supplement.  Respondents were 
administered the supplement once between 1998 and 2006 at or about age 40.  The 
original sample consisted of 12,686 youth 14 to 22 in 1979.  Excluding subsamples 
dropped by the NLSY79 for financial reasons (military sample in 1984 and low 
income white sample in 1991) leaves 9,964 eligible respondents.  8,465 respondents 
(85% of the eligible sample) completed the supplement, including 4,169 men.  4,161 
men have valid school-leaving information.  14 men with missing instrumental 
variable information (described later) are excluded.  I focus on the persistent effects of 
leaving school in a bad economy and retain men who left school 15 years or more 
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4 Unweighted results are consistent with the weighted results.  Similarly, clustering at the school-
leaving state/year level provides consistent standard error estimates as reported in this study.  Results 
are available on request.  
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prior to the supplement (n=4,047).  I exclude men who left school before 1976 
(n=273) as state-level unemployment rates from the BLS are available beginning in 
this year.  The analysis sample includes 3,774 men (Table 1.1) who left school 
between 1976 and 1992.  Results are robust to alternative sample exclusion rules and 
are available on request. 
TABLE 1.1 NLSY79 analysis sample 
Sample Observations 
Original NLSY79 sample 12686 
Sample remaining after NLSY dropped samples 1 9964 
Completed Age 40 Health supplement 8465 
Men who completed Age 40 Health supplement 4169 
Men with valid school-leaving information 4161 
Men with valid instrumental variable information 4147 
Men out of school 15+ years at supplement 4047 
Men who left school 1976 and onwards 3774 
11079 members of the military (n=1208) and white low income (n=1643) subsamples were not 
followed after 1984 and 1991 respectively. 
 
The supplement is well suited to my research objectives.  The timing and 
content permit investigation of persistent effects on multiple health outcomes.  The 
education history and geocodes allow me to locate the exact state, month, and year of 
school-leaving and take advantage of monthly variation in economic conditions.  The 
NLSY79 is a longitudinal survey and offers a substantial advantage over cross-
sectional surveys: cross-sectional data typically do not include school-leaving time or 
location.  Researchers must impute this information, introducing measurement error 
(Genda et al, 2010).  The detailed labor market and demographic histories allow me to 
analyze potential mechanisms.  The rich personal information allows me to control for 
a comprehensive set of covariates.  The NLSY79 has several notable limitations: a 
small sample size, respondents complete the supplement only once, age 40 may be too 
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young to observe health effects, and health outcomes are self-reports rather than 
objective measurements. 
Figure 1.2 presents the quasi-experiment: the seasonally adjusted national 
unemployment rate is plotted between 1976 and 1992 (the years in which my sample 
left school).  This period covers more than a full business cycle and provides 
substantial variation in economic conditions to identify the health effects of leaving 
school in a bad economy.  The U.S. experienced high inflation (late 1970s); three 
recessions (a mild recession in 1980, a severe recession between July 1982 and 
November 1983, and a moderate recession between July 1990 and March 1991); and a 
period of economic growth (late-1980s).  States were differentially impacted by these 
events: bars indicate the yearly minimum and maximum state unemployment rates.  
Because the early 1980s recession lies in the middle of the quasi-experiment, my 
findings are potentially useful for current policy makers.  Although the U.S. has 
undergone substantial economic and demographic changes in the last 30 years, the 
early 1980s recession is arguably the most informative economic event for anticipating 
the persistent impact of the 2007-09 recession.  Both recessions were long contractions 
(16 and 18 months, the average recession between 1945 and 2000 lasted 11 months 
[NBER, 2011]) and generated high, sustained unemployment.  There are differences 
between these two contractions.  For example, the early 1980s recession was 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector while the 2007-09 recession was more 
broadly experienced.   
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FIGURE 1.2. National and high/low state unemployment rate: 1976-1992 
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Notes: Data are drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Historical Unemployment 
Rate data series (series number LNS14000000).   
 
The dependent variables in this study are three health outcomes.5  The Short 
Form 12 physical score (“physical functioning”) ranges from 0 to 100 and is calibrated 
such that 50 is the average score (Quality Metric, 2011).  The score is calculated from 
12 questions on physical functioning from the individual’s perspective (see Table 1.2 
for questions).  The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression score (“depressive 
symptoms”) measures depressive symptoms experienced in the past week (Radloff, 
1977).  Scores are based on 7 items and range from 0 to 24; higher scores indicate 
worse health (see Table 1.3 for questions).  Weighted summary statistics are reported 
in Table 1.4.  Sample means for physical functioning, mental functioning, and 
depressive symptoms are 53.1, 54.0, and 2.63.  These statistics suggest that the sample 
                                                 
5 In unreported analyses I have analyzed self-reported health and chronic conditions.  Results are robust 
and available upon request.   
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is in good health, not surprising as respondents are approximately 40 years old at the 
time of the supplement.   
TABLE 1.2 SF12 items 
Number Question wording 
1 In general, would you say your health is .... 
 The following items are activities you might do during a typical day. Does your 
health limit you in these activities? 
2 ......Moderate activities, such as moving a table, pushing a vacuum cleaner, bowling 
or playing golf? 
3 ......Climbing several flights of stairs? 
 During the past 4 weeks, have you had any of the following problems with your 
work or other regular daily activities as a result of your physical health? 
4 ..... Accomplished less than you would like? 
5 .... Were limited in the kind of work or other activities? 
 During the past 4 weeks, have you had any of the following problems with your 
work or other regular daily activities as a result of any emotional problems (such as 
feeling depressed or anxious)? (Please answer YES or NO for each  
question.) 
6 .... Accomplished less than you would like? 
7 .... Didn't do work or other activities as carefully as usual? 
8 During the past 4 weeks, how much did pain interfere with your normal work 
(including both work outside of the home and housework)? 
 The next questions are about how you feel and how things have been with you 
during the past 4 weeks. for each question, please give the one answer that comes 
closest to the way you have been feeling. How often during the past 4  
weeks.... 
9 .... Have you felt calm and peaceful? 
10 .... Did you have a lot of energy? 
11 .... Have you felt down-hearted and blue? 
12 During the past 4 weeks, how much of the time has your physical health or 
emotional problems interfered with your social activities (like visiting with friends, 
relatives, etc.)? 
 
 
TABLE 1.3. Center for Epidemiologic Depression Studies items 
Number Wording 
 Now I am going to read a list of the ways that you might have felt or behaved 
recently. After each statement, please tell me how often you felt this way during 
the past week. 
1 I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor. 
1A I felt that I could not shake off the blues, even with help from my family or 
friends. 
2 I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing. 
3 I felt depressed. 
4 I felt that everything I did was an effort. 
5 My sleep was restless. 
5A I felt lonely. 
6 I felt sad. 
7 I could not get "going". 
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TABLE 1.4. Weighted health outcomes  
 N Mean SD Min Max 
Physical functioning  3742 53.1 6.78 11.6 68.4 
Mental functioning 3742 54.0 7.34 10.1 72.0 
Depressive symptoms 3717 2.63 3.61 0 21 
 
The key covariate is an indicator for leaving school with a state unemployment 
rate of 9% or higher (“bad economy”).  I focus on the first period of school-leaving, 
this occurs only once for each respondent.  I include both graduates and drop outs in 
the school-leaving definition.  I first use responses to survey items asked between 
1979 and 1998 on education history to identify the first time the respondent left school 
(i.e., exact month and year): respondents are allowed to return to school and remain in 
the sample.6  Next, I use the geocodes to determine the state of school-leaving.7  
Respondents who left school between 1976 and 1978 are assigned the 1979 interview 
state.  This imputation assumes that individuals do not move across state lines between 
school-leaving and 1979 and arguably does not introduce substantial measurement 
error: only 5.9% of school-leaving age men (13 to 28 years) report a between state 
move in the past year.  The interview state is assigned to respondents who left school 
in 1979 and thereafter.  The sample average school-leaving state unemployment rate is 
7.48, and 19.7% of my sample left school in a bad economy.   
Although no there is no single measure of economic activity, the 
unemployment rate provides a reasonable proxy.  It is one of the variables used by the 
                                                 
6 Non-enrolled respondents were asked “When were you last enrolled in regular school? What was the 
month and year?” I require that respondents remain out of school for at least two years.  I locate the 
period of school-leaving using current enrollment items for respondents who do not provide school-
leaving month and year (n=235).  I define the period of school-leaving for these respondents as the first 
period they report enrollment in t-1, non-enrollment in t, and non-enrollment in t+1.  I exclude 
respondents who report never being enrolled in school.   
7 In a robustness check I replace the state of residence with the college state for college attenders.  
Results are consistent. 
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NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee (2010).8  The unemployment rate is easily 
understood, as the rate increases fewer people are employed, and is commonly used to 
measure economic activity in empirical research (Beaudry & DiNardo, 1991; Ruhm, 
2000; Kahn, 2010).  Monthly state unemployment data are available from the BLS.  
The bad economy indicator parallels the current economic climate: the national 
unemployment rate was 8.2% in March 2012; thus findings are relevant for current 
school-leavers. 
The regression models include school-leaving state and year fixed effects; time 
since school-leaving; demographics (race/ethnicity, foreign birth, school-leaving age 
and education); age 14 characteristics (parental education; access to newspapers, 
magazines, or a library card; living with biological parents; number of siblings; rural 
residence; residence in the South); a proxy for health endowment (mother or father 
experiencing a major health problem by the Age 40 Health supplement); a proxy for 
baseline health (height in inches9); and a proxy for ability (age-standardized 1980 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score10).  I include indicators for missing 
                                                 
8 The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee considers GDP, GDI, manufacturing and trade sales, 
industrial production, income, hours worked, and employment (NBER, 2010).  Many of these measures 
are not available by state.  Measuring school-leaving economic conditions with per capita income, male 
unemployment rate, employment growth rates, and employment-to-population rates produced consistent 
results.  In a sensitivity check I replace the interview state with the college state, when different, for 
college attenders.  Results are consistent. 
9 I use height from the 1981 round, the first year height information is collected.  If height is missing in 
1981, I assign the 1982 value.  Height in the NLSY79 is self-reported.  I calculate predicted height 
based on race, ethnicity, and age following equations developed by Cawley & Burkhauser (2006).  
Results are robust if I use self-reported height.  
10 The AFQT is a multiple-choice test that measures arithmetic reasoning, mathematics knowledge, 
paragraph comprehension, and word knowledge used to determine eligibility for enlistment in the U.S. 
Armed Forces.  94% of the sample completed the AFQT in 1980.  Missing AFQT scores were imputed 
using race/ethnicity, and birth year and month fixed effects.  The AFQT is age-standardized as 
respondents completed the test at different ages (15 to 23).  Age-standardized AFQT=(AFQT-[mean 
AFQT for age])/(AFQT SD for age).  Results are unchanged if the raw score is used.     
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covariates and assign missing observations the sample mean (continuous) or mode 
(binary). 
 
IV. Results 
Table 1.5 reports regression results.  Leaving school in a bad economy is 
associated with 1.8% lower physical functioning, 1.2% lower mental functioning, and 
0.333 more depressive symptoms at age 40.  These parameter estimates imply 1.2% to 
12.6% reductions in health and are similar in absolute value as having a mother with a 
high school diploma relative to a mother with less than high school.  I report results 
from a short specification (covariates include school-leaving state and year fixed 
effects).  Results generated in the short specification are nearly identical to the core 
results.  This finding is consistent with the assumption that men who leave school in a 
bad economy are not systematically different from men who leave school in stronger 
economies.   
TABLE 1.5. Effect of leaving school in a bad economy on health at age 40: Core regression results 
 Log(physical 
functioning) 
Log(mental 
functioning) 
Depressive  
symptoms 
Mean 53.1 54.0 2.63 
Full specification -0.018* -0.012* 0.333* 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.186) 
Short specification -0.018* -0.016** 0.333* 
 (0.010) (0.007) (0.175) 
N 3742 3742 3717 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; 
**; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
Table 1.6 reports results for women.  The parameter estimates suggest that 
women are largely unaffected by leaving school in a bad economy, at least as 
measured by the health outcomes I investigate.  Leaving school in a bad economy is 
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hypothesized to operate partially through career and marriage outcomes.  Historically, 
women are less likely to participate in the labor market than men.  Figure 1.3 plots 
labor force participation rates by sex between 1976 and 2010.  In all years women 
have a lower probability of participating in the labor market than men: in 1976 48% of 
women participated in the labor market while 78% of men participated.  Leaving 
school in a bad economy may not have a substantial effect on women’s careers as 
women have less to lose than men.  Economic theories of marriage predict that career 
outcomes are stronger marriage determinants for men than women (Becker, 1981).  
Labor market participation patterns and economic theory are consistent with studies 
that document no robust associations between economic conditions at school-leaving 
and employment or marriage among women (Kondo, 2008; Hershbien, 2012).  I focus 
on men in the remainder of this study, although examining the relationship between 
leaving school in a bad economy and women’s health is an interesting direction for 
future research. 
TABLE 1.6. Effect of leaving school in a bad economy on health at age 40 among women 
 Log(physical 
functioning) 
Log(mental 
functioning) 
Depressive 
symptoms 
Mean/proportion 51.8 52.0 3.68 
Estimate -0.007 -0.013 -0.094 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.349) 
N 3844 3844 3827 
Notes: Estimate is parameter estimate on bad economy indicator.  Standard errors are clustered 
by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; **; * = statistically significant at the 
1%; 5%; 10% level. 
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FIGURE 1.3. Labor force participation by sex: 1976-2010 
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Notes: Data are drawn from a special request by the author from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (Data on Employment Status by State and Demographic 
Group).   
 
In Table 1.7 I report results using indicators for school-leaving state 
unemployment rates of 5 to < 6%; 6 to < 7%; 7 to  <8%; 8 to <9%; 9 to <10%; 10 to 
<11%; and 11% +  with <5% as the omitted category to motivate the bad economy 
indicator.  Negative health effects generally do not emerge at lower levels of 
unemployment (less than 8%) but become evident at higher levels (8-9% +).  Results 
are robust if the linear state unemployment rate is used.  Defining a bad economy as a 
school-leaving state unemployment rate of 10% or higher generally implies larger 
effects than those estimated in the core model.  For parsimony, I report results using 
the 9% bad economy indicator.    
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TABLE 1.7. Effect of leaving school in a bad economy on health at age 40: Various measures of a 
bad economy 
 Log(physical 
functioning) 
Log(mental 
functioning) 
Depressive 
symptoms 
Mean 53.1 54.0 2.63 
Indicators    
5 - <6% -0.007 -0.013 0.094 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.347) 
6 - <7% -0.006 -0.009 0.171 
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.305) 
7 - <8% -0.012 -0.001 -0.289 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.305) 
8 - <9% -0.003 -0.025 0.050 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.316) 
9 - <10% -0.022 -0.016 -0.099 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.356) 
10 - <11% -0.017 -0.029 0.320 
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.502) 
11% + -0.028 -0.031 0.389 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.368) 
Unemployment rate -0.004** -0.003* 0.019 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.043) 
Unemployment rate >10% -0.013 -0.020 0.544*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.192) 
N 3742 3742 3717 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  
Omitted category in indicator school-leaving unemployment rate regression is a school-leaving 
state unemployment rate less than 5%. ***; **; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% 
level. 
 
Tables 1.8 through 1.11 report health effects by race/ethnicity (non-white vs. 
white), family background (proxied by father’s education: less than high school vs. 
high school or more), expected occupation (blue collar vs. white collar11), and skill at 
school-leaving (no college degree vs. college graduate).  Labor studies document that 
career effects are largest among white and high skill workers.  First, I stratify the 
sample by race/ethnicity.  Interesting heterogeneity emerges.  Non-white men who 
leave school in a bad economy may experience better physical functioning than non-
white men who leave school in a stronger economy.  However, they have lower 
                                                 
11 In 1979 respondents were asked what they expected to be doing at age 35.  One response was 
“working.”  Those who reported working were asked their expected occupation.  I code managerial, 
professional, or technical sales as white collar.  
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mental functioning and more depressive symptoms by age 40.  White men who leave 
school in a bad economy have worse health across all domains than white men who do 
not.  These results imply that physical health effects are concentrated among white 
men while mental health effects are experienced by all men, but the effect may be 
largest among non-whites.  Stratifying the sample by family background, occupation, 
or skill suggests that negative health effects are generally concentrated among men 
with more high skill fathers, men who expect a white collar job, and men with a 
college degree.  My findings are broadly consistent with labor studies that identify the 
largest career effects among high skill men, although the mental health results by 
race/ethnicity are somewhat different (e.g., Kondo, 2007; Oyer, 2006; Kahn, 2010). 
TABLE 1.8. Effect of leaving school on health at age 40 by race/ethnicity 
 Non-white White 
 N Mean Estimate N Mean Estimate 
Log(physical  1859 52.21 0.022 1883 53.32 -0.026** 
functioning)   (0.017)   (0.012) 
Log(mental  1859 54.22 -0.023 1883 53.96 -0.009 
functioning)   (0.015)   (0.010) 
Depressive  1842 3.10 0.806* 1875 2.51 0.213 
symptoms   (0.413)   (0.187) 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; 
**; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
TABLE 1.9. Effect of leaving school on health at age 40 by family background 
 Father less than high school Father high school or higher 
 N Mean Estimate N Mean Estimate 
Log(physical  2932 52.69 -0.014 810 54.03 -0.025 
functioning)   (0.016)   (0.019) 
Log(mental  2932 54.00 -0.010 810 54.05 -0.024 
functioning)   (0.009)   (0.015) 
Depressive  2910 2.83 0.224 807 2.16 0.775** 
symptoms   (0.265)   (0.333) 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; 
**; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
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TABLE 1.10. Effect of leaving school on health at age 40 by expected occupation 
 Do not expect white collar Expect white collar 
 N Mean Estimate N Mean Estimate 
Log(physical  1406 52.36 0.008 1802 53.68 -0.021 
functioning)   (0.013)   (0.014) 
Log(mental  1406 53.74 0.027** 1802 54.11 -0.026* 
functioning)   (0.013)   (0.015) 
Depressive  1393 3.05 0.091 1789 2.35 0.518* 
symptoms   (0.430)   (0.298) 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; 
**; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
TABLE 1.11. Effect of leaving school on health at age 40 by skill  
 Less than college  College graduate 
 N Mean Estimate N Mean Estimate 
Log(physical  3187 52.63 -0.018 555 54.97 -0.009 
functioning)   (0.012)   (0.015) 
Log(mental  3187 53.92 -0.008 555 54.37 -0.025 
functioning)   (0.007)   (0.017) 
Depressive  3164 2.86 0.281 553 1.70 0.530 
symptoms   (0.211)   (0.469) 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; 
**; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
The second objective of this study is to shed light on potential mechanisms for 
the net relationship between leaving school in a bad economy and health at age 40.  
The net relationship is hypothesized to operate, at least partially, through career 
outcomes, marriage, fertility, education, and unmet expectations.  I investigate 
potential mechanisms in this section.  Potential mechanisms (measured at the 
supplement) including labor supply (full time employment, weeks worked per year, 
hours worked per week), income (hourly wage, poverty), job attributes (white collar 
job, satisfaction, health insurance, visiting a doctor in the past year, shift work), job 
churning (number of jobs across the career, tenure), marital status (married, divorced, 
never married), fertility (any children), education obtained after school-leaving, and 
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self-esteem are constructed.12  Self-esteem is measured using the Rosenberg (1965) 
scale.  The scale is based on 10 items and higher scores indicate higher levels of self 
esteem.  Table 1.12 reports the list of scale items. 
TABLE 1.12. Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem scale questions 
Number Wording 
 Now I'm going to read a list of opinions people have about themselves.  After I 
read each statement, please tell me how much you strongly agree, agree, disagree 
or strongly disagree with these opinions. 
1 I feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on equal basis with others. 
2 I feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
3 All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
4 I am able to do things as well as most other people. 
5 I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
6 I take a positive attitude toward myself. 
7 On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
8 I wish I could have more respect for myself. 
9 I certainly feel useless at times 
10 At times I think I am no good at all 
 
Mechanisms are 1) regressed on the bad economy indicator in separate 
regressions and 2) are entered into the health production function as additional 
regressors.  If these outcomes are mechanisms they should be predicted by the bad 
economy indicator and health effects should decline after their inclusion in the health 
production function.   
Tables 1.13 and 1.14 report results from the first exercise.  Men who leave 
school in a bad economy are less likely to work full time, work fewer hours per week, 
are more likely to live in poverty, are more likely to work an irregular shift, exhibit 
evidence of higher job churning (lower tenure at the current job, more jobs across the 
                                                 
12 Full time employment is defined as working 35+ hours per week.  Annual weeks worked, weekly 
hours, and total number of jobs across the career relate to all jobs.  Wage, occupation (professional, 
managerial, or technical sales), job satisfaction, health insurance, shift work, and tenure pertain to the 
primary job.  The CPI is used to convert hourly wages into 2008 dollars.  Wages less (more) than $1 
($1000) are excluded.  Additional schooling is the difference between years of school-leaving at the 
supplement and school-leaving.   
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career), and are less likely to be married (this effect operates through foregone 
marriage).  Such men may work fewer weeks per year, earn lower wages, be less 
likely to work in a white collar job, work in less satisfying jobs, have less access to 
employ-sponsored health insurance, use fewer medical services, be less likely to have 
children, be less likely to attain additional schooling, and have lower self-esteem; but 
these relationships are imprecisely estimated.  
TABLE 1.13.  Effect of leaving school on labor market outcomes at age 40 
 N Mean/proportion Estimate 
Full time employment 3768 0.80 -0.042** 
   (0.017) 
Annual weeks worked 3433 49.31 -0.119 
   (0.296) 
Weekly hours 3768 41.28 -2.144* 
   (1.129) 
Log(hourly wage) 3467 22.77 -0.015 
   (0.041) 
Poverty 3475 0.09 0.044*** 
   (0.014) 
White collar job 3370 0.50 -0.008 
   (0.026) 
Satisfied with job 3534 0.49 -0.003 
   (0.034) 
Health insurance 3165 0.84 -0.015 
   (0.023) 
Visit doctor in the past year 3475 0.58 -0.020 
   (0.039) 
Irregular shift 3354 0.21 0.042** 
   (0.020) 
Number of jobs 3774 11.33 1.078** 
   (0.423) 
Tenure (weeks) 3500. 383.16 -39.730* 
   (20.315) 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; 
**; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
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TABLE 1.14. Effect of leaving school on marriage, fertility, education, and self-esteem outcomes 
at age 40 
 N Mean/proportion Estimate 
Married 3774 0.64 -0.062** 
   (0.029) 
Never married 3774 0.17 0.043* 
   (0.022) 
Divorced 3774 0.19 0.020 
   (0.023) 
Children 3774 0.75 -0.029 
   (0.023) 
Additional education 3774 0.34 -0.015 
   (0.026) 
Self-esteem scale 3280 23.84 -0.505 
   (0.311) 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; 
**; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
 Results from the second exercise are reported in Table 1.15: mechanisms are 
entered into the core model as additional regressors.  Parameter estimates generated in 
these models may not have a causal interpretation: the mechanisms are determined by 
the bad economy indicator (“bad controls”); inclusion of bad controls in a regression 
model can lead to biased estimates (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).  These mechanisms 
explain some, but not all, of the association between leaving school in a bad economy 
and health at age 40: estimates decline by 44% to 67%.  These findings suggest that 
the net relationship operates at least partially through career, marriage, fertility, 
education, and self-esteem.   
TABLE 1.15. Effect of leaving school on health at age 40, augmented health production function 
 N Mean Core +Mechanisms % Δ β 
Log(physical  3742 53.1 -0.018* -0.010 -44.44 
functioning)   (0.010) (0.011)  
Log(mental  3742 54.0 -0.012* -0.004 -66.67 
functioning)   (0.007) (0.009)  
Depressive  3717 2.63 0.333* 0.114 -65.77 
symptoms   (0.186) (0.197)  
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  % Δ β 
=(βM-βC)/(βC)*100.  ***; **; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
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V. Robustness Checks 
This section reports results from a series of robustness checks.  An obvious 
concern is that the time or location of school-leaving is endongeous to the 
contemporaneous unemployment rate.  School-leavers may engage in endogenous 
timing (enrolling in additional schooling, dropping out, forced out for financial 
reasons) or migration (moving to a stronger labor market).  The intuition for the sign 
of the potential bias is as follows.  School-leavers who avoid bad economies have 
characteristics (ability, financial resources, forethought) that permit avoidance 
behavior.  These characteristics are arguably positively correlated with age 40 health.  
The rich background information contained in the NLSY79 allows me to control, at 
least partially, for these characteristics.  To the extent that characteristics remain 
unobservable, failure to account for them is expected to bias least squares estimates 
away from zero.13  Classical measurement error in the school-leaving variables, a 
familiar feature of survey data, will attenuate least squares estimates towards zero.  If 
measurement error is non-classical, the direction of the bias is ambiguous (Bound et 
al, 2001).  It is not clear a priori which effect will dominate. 
Table 1.16 reports a basic test for endogenous timing and migration.  The 
sample is split between men who left school in a bad economy and men who did not.  
If school-leavers are avoiding bad economies, differences in observable characteristics 
should exist between men who leave school in a bad economy and men who do not.  
                                                 
13 Assume the true model takes the following form: H_40is=α0 + α1Uis + α2Cis; α1<0; α2>0.  Cis is scalar 
that captures characteristics that allow avoidance behavior and are positively associated with age 40 
health.  The estimated model can be written as H_40is=β0 + β1Uis; β1 <0.  The association between 
omitted and included regressor takes the form Cis=γ0 + γ1Uis; γ1<0.  The omitted variable formula 
implies β1 = α1 + γ1 * α2; γ1 * α2 <0: least squares estimates are biased away from zero. 
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However, these groups of men are broadly similar in terms of their observable 
characteristics and there are few statistically significant differences.  Differences may 
be an artifact of the early 1980s recession: this recession was concentrated in northern 
states with relatively high prevalence of whites and relatively low prevalence of 
Hispanics (e.g., Michigan).  The Appendix reports an exploratory analysis into 
endogenous timing and migration using proxies for these behaviors contained in the 
NLSY79.  The results suggest that endogenous behavior is not driving the findings.   
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TABLE 1.16. Test of covariate balance  
 School-leaving 
UE<9% 
School-leaving 
UE>=9% 
Difference 
Unemployment rate at school-leaving 6.56 11.2 -4.64* 
Time since school-leaving 22.4 22.1 0.3 
School-leaving year 1980.2 1981.4 -1.2 
Age at school-leaving 19.0 19.2 -0.2 
White 0.78 0.83 -0.05* 
Black 0.14 0.13 0.01 
Hispanic 0.070 0.041 0.029* 
Foreign born 0.042 0.037 0.005 
Less than high school at school-leaving 0.19 0.13 0.06* 
High school at school-leaving 0.47 0.47 0 
Some college at school-leaving 0.15 0.17 -0.02 
College graduate at school-leaving 0.19 0.22 -0.03 
Father’s years of schooling 12.0 11.9 0.1 
Father’s years of schooling missing 0.100 0.085 0.015 
Mother’s years of schooling 11.7 11.8 -0.1 
Mother’s years of schooling missing 0.048 0.060 -0.012 
Magazines age 14 0.67 0.71 -0.04 
Magazines age 14 missing 0.0079 0.0045 0.0034 
Newspaper age 14 0.84 0.87 -0.03 
Newspaper age 14 missing 0.0012 0.0045 -0.0033 
Library card age 14 0.75 0.71 0.04 
Library card age 14 missing 0.0021 0.0051 -0.003 
Live with biological parents age 14 0.76 0.76 0 
Live with biological parents age 14 missing 0.0026 0.00040 0.0022 
Number of siblings 3.28 3.18 0.1 
Number of siblings missing 0.00038 0 0.00038 
Rural residence at age 14 0.22 0.24 -0.02 
Rural residence at age 14 missing 0.0026 0.0029 -0.0003 
Reside in South at age 14 0.31 0.25 0.06* 
Reside in South at age 14 missing 0.028 0.018 0.01 
Father major health problem 0.39 0.36 0.03 
Father major health problem missing 0.028 0.034 -0.006 
Mother major health problem 0.41 0.40 0.01 
Mother major health problem missing 0.071 0.071 0 
Height in 1981 69.8 69.6 0.2 
Height in 1981 missing 0.0090 0.0081 0.0009 
AFQT score standardized 0.28 0.36 -0.08 
Observations 3083 691  
Notes: *Statistically different from zero at 1% confidence interval. 
 
I use two-stage least squares to address remaining endogeneity concerns and 
measurement error in the school-leaving variables.14  Two variables are used to 
                                                 
14 Results are consistent if a two-step residual inclusion (2RSI) estimator is employed. Terza et al 
(2008) argue that the 2SRI estimator is more appropriate if the potentially endogenous variable is binary 
as in my model.  Angrist (2001) contends that two stage least squares can generate consistent estimates 
of causal effects in the presence of a binary endogenous variable. 
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instrument for leaving school in a bad economy: 1) on-time state unemployment rates 
and 2) respondent-expected state unemployment rates.  I create on-time state 
unemployment rates using birth date, state of residence at age 14, and education at 
school-leaving.15  Respondents are assigned the state unemployment rate they would 
face if they left school on time.  For example, I assign a college graduate the June 
(modal school-leaving month in my sample) unemployment rate in the year he turned 
22 (modal school-leaving age for college graduates in my sample) in the state of 
residence at age 14.  State of residence at age 14 is used as it is arguably exogenous to 
the school-leaver while the school-leaving state is suspect.  I make similar assignments 
for all educational levels.  I construct respondent-expected16 state unemployment rates 
using birth date, reported educational expectations in 1979, and state of residence at 
age 14.  In 1979 respondents were asked “What level of education do you expect to 
attain?”  The respondent-expected state unemployment rate is the unemployment rate 
the respondent would have faced had he left school at his expected time.  For example, 
I assign a respondent who reported that he expected to complete high school the June 
unemployment rate in the year he turns 18 in state of residence at age 14.  I make 
similar assignments for all levels of expected education.  The compliers are men who 
form an educational plan and do not deviate in response to contemporaneous 
macroeconomic fluctuations.  The time since school-leaving is also potentially 
endogenous.  I instrument time since school-leaving with the on-time and respondent-
                                                 
15 I use 1965 compulsory schooling laws to calculate school start dates (see Appendix Table 1 in Cascio 
& Lewis, 2006).  
16 I would like to thank David Card for suggesting this instrumental variable.   
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expected time since school-leaving variables.17  The school-leaving state and year 
fixed effects are replaced with age 14 state fixed effects and on-time and respondent-
expected year fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered by the age 14 state of 
residence.   
The key identifying assumption in this model is, after conditioning on personal 
characteristics and various fixed effects, the IVs are correctly excludable from the 
health production function.  The IVs must predict the endogenous regressor to 
consistently estimate a local average treatment effect for the compliers.  Table 1.17 
presents results from first-stage regressions: in separate equations I regress the bad 
economy indicator on the IV and covariates using a linear probability model.  The IVs 
are strong, with F-statistics well above 10 (Stock et al, 2002): 99.83 and 82.23.  A 1 
percentage point increase in the on-time and respondent-expected state unemployment 
rate is associated with a 10.5 and 8.4 percentage point increase in the probability of 
leaving school in a bad economy.  By construction there is less variation in the 
instrumented probability of leaving school in a bad economy than in the bad economy 
indicator: on-time and respondent-expected school-leaving occurs in June, while 
monthly variation is used to construct the bad economy indicator.  Thus, the IV 
parameters may be less precisely estimated than the core model parameters.18   
                                                 
17 I define the on-time since school-leaving as the supplement year minus the on-time school-leaving 
year; I define respondent-expected time since school-leaving analogously.  
18 Instrumental variable estimators typically use less variation than used by the least squares estimator 
to estimate effects.  The former set of estimators relies on variation in the potentially endogenous 
regressor induced by the instrumental variable.  Alternatively, the least squares estimator uses all 
variation in the potentially endogenous variable.  
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TABLE 1.17. Effect of instrumental variables on the probability of leaving school in a bad 
economy 
 On-time Respondent-expected 
Proportion 0.197 0.197 
IV 0.105*** 0.084*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) 
F-statistic 99.83 82.23 
Observations 3774 3774 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by age 14 state and reported in parentheses.  ***; **; * = 
statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
The IV, reported in Table 1.18, results are consistent with the core results 
(Table 1.5).  IV estimates imply that leaving school in a bad economy leads to 3.3% 
lower physical functioning and 0.429 more depressive symptoms.  Surprisingly, 
leaving school in a bad economy leads to a 0.5% increase in mental functioning; 
although the wide confidence interval contains zero and cannot rule out a negative 
effect consistent with the core results.  Results are robust if I estimate just-identified 
models.  Table 1.19 reports results from an intent-to-treat model.  Parameter estimates 
represent an averaged effect between compliers who are fully affected by leaving 
school in a bad economy and non-compliers who are unaffected.  Results are 
consistent with the core models: by age 40 men who left school in a bad economy 
have worse physical functioning, mental functioning, and depressive symptomatology.   
TABLE 1.18. Effect of leaving school on health at age 40: IV model 
 N Mean Core model IV model 
Log(physical functioning) 3742 53.1 -0.018* -0.033 
   (0.010) (0.024) 
Log(mental functioning) 3742 54.0 -0.012* 0.005 
   (0.007) (0.015) 
Depressive symptoms 3717 2.63 0.333* 0.429 
   (0.186) (0.428) 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by age 14 state and reported in parentheses.  ***; **; * = 
statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
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TABLE 1.19. Effect of leaving school on health at age 40: Intent-to-treat model 
 N Mean Core 
model 
On time Respondent 
expected 
Log(physical functioning) 3742 53.1 -0.018* -0.013 -0.008 
   (0.010) (0.010) (0.008) 
Log(mental functioning) 3742 54.0 -0.012* -0.0003 -0.002 
   (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) 
Depressive symptoms 3717 2.63 0.333* 0.051 0.099 
   (0.186) (0.210) (0.246) 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by age 14 state and reported in parentheses.  ***; **; * = 
statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
Next, I use a family fixed effect estimator to assess persistent health effects of 
leaving school in a bad economy.  This estimator controls for all family-invariant 
characteristics that are correlated with leaving school in a bad economy and age 40 
health; thus the family fixed estimator may better control for individual heterogeneity 
than the core model.  Variation is generated by siblings who face different economic 
conditions at school-leaving: I compare the age 40 health of siblings who left school in 
a bad economy with the age 40 health of siblings who did not.  The sibling sample 
includes 1,137 male, biological siblings from 526 families with 2 to 5 male children 
identified in the 1979 roster.  Results, reported in Table 1.20, are consistent with the 
core findings (Table 1.5).  I present results generated in the sibling sample with and 
without the family fixed effect, results are broadly consistent across the specifications 
although estimated effects are larger after including the family fixed effect.  In the 
preferred specifications that include a family fixed effect, men who leave school in a 
bad economy have 4.1% lower physical functioning, 6.8% lower mental functioning, 
and 0.942 more depressive symptoms than siblings who leave school in a stronger 
economy.  These results are consistent with the core findings. 
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TABLE 1.20. Effect of leaving school on health at age 40: Family FE model 
 Core model Family fixed effect model 
 N Mean Estimate N Mean No FE FE 
Log(physical  3742 53.1 -0.018* 1128 53.35 -0.012 -0.041 
functioning)   (0.010)   (0.022) (0.042) 
Log(mental  3742 54.0 -0.012* 1128 54.19 -0.051*** -0.068* 
functioning)   (0.007)   (0.019) (0.034) 
Depressive  3717 2.63 0.333* 1124 2.60 0.609 0.942 
symptoms   (0.186)   (0.374) (0.812) 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; 
**; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
Table 1.21 reports results from models that use the school-leaving region 
unemployment rate to define a bad economy at school-leaving.  These models permit 
endogenous migration within the region.  School-leaving region fixed effects replace 
state fixed effects and robust standard errors are reported; covariates are unchanged.  
Results are broadly consistent with the core results: men who leave school in a bad 
economy have 1.0% lower physical functioning, 0.6% lower mental functioning, and 
0.215 more depressive symptoms at age 40 than men who left school in a stronger 
economy.  The estimates are imprecise, not surprising as I rely on within region 
variation to identify health effects.   
 
TABLE 1.21. Effect of leaving school on health at age 40: Regional unemployment rates 
 N Mean Core model Region UE 
rate 
Log(physical functioning) 3742 53.1 -0.018* -0.010 
   (0.010) (0.011) 
Log(mental functioning) 3742 54.0 -0.012* -0.006 
   (0.007) (0.012) 
Depressive symptoms 3717 2.63 0.333* 0.215 
   (0.186) (0.270) 
Notes: Robust standard errors reported in parentheses.  ***; **; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 
5%; 10% level. 
 
An important source of bias is between school-leaving state differences in 
difficult to observe characteristics that are correlated with leaving school in a bad 
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economy and age 40 health.  The core model includes school-leaving state fixed 
effects and controls for time invariant differences.  My sample left school between 
1976 and 1992, and state characteristics may have changed over this period.  In this 
section I first estimate the core model without school-leaving state fixed effects and 
second augment the core model with school-leaving state-specific linear time trends.  
The former specification uses variation between school-leaving states and variation 
within school-leaving state over time to identify health effects.  The latter specification 
uses variation off a school-leaving state linear time trend and controls for time-varying 
between school-leaving state differences; this specification is more demanding on the 
data than the core model.  Results, reported in Table 1.22, are consistent with the core 
results regardless of how I model between state differences.19  One interpretation of 
these results is that the core findings are not driven by difficult-to-observe between 
state differences. 
TABLE 1.22. Effect of leaving school on health at age 40: School-leaving state unobservable 
characteristics 
 N Mean 
 
Core  
model 
No state 
fixed effect 
State-specific 
time trend 
Log(physical  3742 53.1 -0.018* -0.014* -0.011 
functioning)   (0.010) (0.007) (0.011) 
Log(mental  3742 54.0 -0.012* -0.006 -0.009 
functioning)   (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Depressive  3717 2.63 0.333* 0.177 0.306 
symptoms   (0.186) (0.159) (0.195) 
Notes: Estimate is parameter estimate on bad economy indicator.   Standard errors are clustered 
by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; **; * = statistically significant at the 
1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
                                                 
19 School-leaving state-specific time trends soak up much of the variation in school-leaving economic 
conditions.  Variance inflation factors, a common metric for testing collinearity, are often above 10.  
This is a sign of problematic collinearity and ill-conditioning (Anderson & Wells, 2007).   These data 
limitations can lead to inflated standard errors.   
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I next perform a series of falsification tests.  I select two outcomes that should 
not be predicted by leaving school in a bad economy: natural blond hair and blue eyes 
(coded one for blond hair or blue eyes; zero otherwise).  13% of the sample has blond 
hair and 29% have blue eyes.  Results (Table 1.23) suggest no relationship between 
leaving school in a bad economy and these outcomes: parameter estimates are small 
and indistinguishable from zero.   
TABLE 1.23. Effect of leaving school in a bad economy on hair and eye color 
 Blond hair Blue eyes 
Proportion 0.13 0.28 
Bad economy -0.019 0.006 
 (0.020) (0.024) 
Observations 3643 3645 
Notes:  Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; 
**; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
This section tests whether bias from non-random attrition is driving the 
findings.  In 2006, the last year the supplement was fielded, the NLSY79 retention rate 
was 77% and 85% of eligible respondents completed the supplement.  I use sample 
weights, which correct for attrition, in all analyses.  To test whether attrition remains a 
concern, I compare demographics of completers and attritors; regress the probability 
of attriting on the bad economy indicator; and re-estimate the core model assigning 
attritors 1) a healthy outcome and 2) an unhealthy outcome (bounding exercise).  
Healthy outcomes are physical and mental functioning scores at the 90th percentile, 
and depressive symptoms set to zero.  I define unhealthy outcomes symmetrically: 
physical and mental functioning (depressive symptoms) at the 10th (90th) percentile.  
Table 15 reports the comparison of observable characteristics by attrition status.  I do 
not include respondents dropped by the NLSY79 for financial reasons or respondents I 
exclude from the sample due to missing variables, time since school-leaving, or 
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school-leaving year.  These groups are broadly similar in terms of observable 
characteristics (Table 1.24).  Results reported in Tables 1.25 and 1.26 imply that 
leaving school in a bad economy does not strongly predict attrition and results are 
robust to the bounding exercise.  One reason for a non-interview is mortality.  
Interestingly, men who leave school in a bad economy may be a higher risk of all-
cause mortality than men who leave school in a stronger economy.  The parameter 
estimate is imprecise, but I can rule out a zero effect.  This relationship may explain 
the modest association between leaving school in a bad economy and the probability 
of attrition.   
TABLE 1.24. Observable characteristics by attrition status 
 Complete 
(n=3774) 
Attrite 
(n=761) 
Difference 
White 0.79 0.81 -0.02 
Black 0.15 0.13 0.02 
Hispanic 0.064 0.060 0.004 
Foreign born 0.041 0.054 -0.013 
Father’s education 12.1 12.1 0 
Father’s education missing 0.094 0.11 -0.016 
Mother’s education 11.8 11.8 0 
Mother’s education missing 0.050 0.053 -0.003 
Magazines age 14 0.68 0.67 0.01 
Magazines age 14 missing 0.0070 0.0061 0.0009 
Newspaper age 14 0.85 0.86 -0.01 
Newspaper age 14 missing 0.0020 0.0034 -0.0014 
Library card age 14 0.74 0.77 -0.03 
Library card age 14 missing 0.0029 0.0028 0.0001 
Live with biological parents age 14 0.76 0.76 0 
Live with biological parents age 14 missing 0.0023 0.0030 -0.0007 
Rural residence at age 14 0.22 0.20 0.02 
Rural residence at age 14 missing 0.0028 0.0020 0.0008 
Reside in South at age 14 0.30 0.25 0.05* 
Reside in South at age 14 missing 0.024 0.026 -0.002 
Height in 1981 69.8 69.5 0.3 
Height in 1981 missing 0.0084 0.060 -0.0516* 
Age-standardized AFQT score 0.31 0.31 0 
Notes:*=statistically different from zero at the 1% level. 
 
38 
TABLE 1.25. Effect of leaving school in a bad economy on probability of attrition and all-cause 
mortality at age 40 
 Attrite Mortality 
Proportion 0.18 0.04 
Bad economy 0.023 0.019 
 (0.019) (0.013) 
Observations 4535 4535 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; 
**; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
 
TABLE 1.26. Effect of leaving school on health at age 40: Bounding exercise 
 N Mean Core N Healthy 
outcome 
Unhealthy 
outcome 
Log(physical  3742 53.1 -0.018* 4535 -0.010 -0.023** 
functioning)   (0.010)  (0.011) (0.010) 
Log(mental  3742 54.0 -0.012* 4535 -0.006 -0.017* 
functioning)   (0.007)  (0.012) (0.009) 
Depressive  3717 2.63 0.333* 4535 0.215 0.450** 
symptoms   (0.186)  (0.270) (0.217) 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; 
**; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
In this section I report results from a factor analysis.  Variation in my three 
selected health outcomes may be driven by a smaller set of latent variables.  Factor 
analysis models these latent variables as a linear combination of my three observed 
health outcomes.  I use the principal components method to analyze the correlation 
matrix between my three health outcomes. I retain two factors.  Factor loadings, which 
report correlations between the factors and health outcomes, are reported in Table 
1.27.  Factor 1 loads most heavily on mental functioning and depressive symptoms. 
Factor 2 loads most heavily on physical functioning.  Results (Table 1.28) indicate that 
men who leave school in a bad economy have lower measures of latent health, 
particularly as measured by Factor 1 which captures dimensions of mental health, by 
age 40 than men who do not.    
39 
TABLE 1.27. Factor loadings 
Health outcome Factor 1 Factor 2 
Physical functioning 0.079 0.219 
Mental functioning 0.388 -0.105 
Depressive symptoms -0.473   -0.154 
 
 
TABLE 1.28. Effect of leaving school on health at age 40: Factor analysis 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Mean 0.026 0.023 
Estimate -0.077** -0.023 
 (0.034) (0.015) 
Observations 3696 3696 
Notes: Estimate is parameter estimate on bad economy indicator.  Standard errors are clustered 
by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; **; * = statistically significant at the 
1%; 5%; 10% level. 
 
VII. Discussion 
This study provides the first published evidence on the persistent health effects 
of leaving school in a bad economy.  Findings contribute to the labor literature 
examining career effects of leaving school in a bad economy; literatures on the health 
effects of employment and the macroeconomy; and the growing health literature that 
investigates important development periods.  My results suggest that by age 40 men 
who left school in a bad economy have worse health, particularly mental health, than 
men who did not.  The effect sizes are similar in absolute value as having a mother 
with a high school diploma relative to a mother who dropped out of high school.  
Health effects vary by race/ethnicity, family background, occupation, and skill.  
Supplementary analyses suggest career, marriage, fertility, education, and self-esteem 
outcomes as mechanisms.  Results are robust to various econometric specifications, 
including the use of instrumental variables to correct for the potential endogeneity of 
the school-leaving variables.  Factor analysis suggests that effects may be 
concentrated among mental health domains.  The current findings imply that labor 
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studies underestimate the full cost of leaving school in a bad economy: consequences 
extend beyond the career and into the health domain. 
Recent work on avoidance behavior suggests that individuals respond to health 
shocks in ways that minimize health damage (Niedell, 2009; Moretti & Niedell, 2011).  
Failure to account for such avoidance behavior can lead to underestimates of the true 
effect of a health shock.  For example, men who are initially placed in an unhealthy 
job because they left school in a bad economy may undertake actions (diet, exercise, 
stress management) to offset health effects.  The avoidance literature implies that the 
parameter estimates have the interpretation of lower bounds and the true health effects 
of leaving school in a bad economy are larger than those estimated in this study.20 
Policy makers may find my results useful.  There is general concern for the 
economic well-being of the current cohort of school-leavers (e.g., von Wachter, 2010).  
My findings suggest that the full effects of leaving school extend beyond career 
outcomes.  Government policies should take into account the magnitude and 
persistence of health effects associated with leaving school in a bad economy: effects 
potentially represent substantial health losses (the core estimates imply a 1.2% to 
12.6% reduction in health outcomes relative to sample means, and the avoidance 
literature suggests that these underestimate the true health effects) that are evident 
more than 20 years after school-leaving.  Health policy can be packaged with career 
                                                 
20 Following Moretti and Niedell (2011) a standard health production function can be augmented to 
allow avoidance behavior: H=H(S*A,X) where H is health, S is a health shock, A is avoidance behavior, 
and X is all other health determinants.  To observe the impact of avoidance behavior, one can take the 
derivative with respect to the shock: H/S = H/S + H/A*A//S.  The first term is the biological 
effect and the second term is the avoidance term.  If H/S>0, then H/A*A//S is likely > 0 
(individuals undertake action to minimize damage imposed by a health shock).  Failing to account for 
the second term will lead to an underestimate of the health effect.  
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re-orientation policies (von Wachter, 2010).  For example, general information on how 
long a recovery period may last, health effects of a low-quality job, steps individuals 
can take to offset negative effects, and access to health programs (e.g. stress 
management) can be provided to labor market entrants.  Locating health information at 
unemployment centers my increase awareness.   
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APPENDIX: EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF SCHOOL-LEAVING TIME 
AND LOCATION 
 
School-leavers may avoid leaving school in a bad economy through 
endogenous timing (enrollment, dropping out of school to take a job, leaving school 
for financial reasons) and migration (moving across state lines).  In this section I first 
review the published U.S. literature on endogenous behavior.  Second, I report an 
analysis of these behaviors using proxies contained in the NLSY79.   
The empirical evidence in the U.S. suggests that delaying school-leaving 
through enrollment is not common.  Corman (1983) shows that the state 
unemployment rate is not a strong correlate of college or vocational school attendance 
among men.  Betts and McFarland (1995) find that a 1% increase in the state 
unemployment rate is associated with a 0.5% increase in full-time attendance at 
community colleges among recent high school graduates.  Genda et al (2010) identify 
little correlation between the state unemployment rate and enrollment among men in 
the Current Population Survey.  Card and Lemieux (2000) show that the state 
unemployment rate at age 18 is a modest predictor of high school completion, but not 
college outcomes, among young men.  Kahn (2010) finds that the state unemployment 
rate at age 18 is a weak predictor of college completion in the NLSY79.  Students may 
decide to drop out of school to take advantage of a strong economy or may be forced 
out of school during a bad economy if they cannot afford education costs.  Published 
evidence suggests the former dominates: the probability of dropping out increases 
modestly as the unemployment rate declines (Rumberger, 1983; Rees & Mocan, 
1997).  School-leavers may move from a weak to a strong labor market at school-
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leaving.  In 2000 42 million Americans moved.  11% reported moving because of a 
new job or to look for work, while 51.6% moved for housing-related reasons (U.S. 
Census, 2001).  These statistics suggest that a minority of movers move for work-
related reasons.   
The NLSY79 contains proxies for endogenous timing and migration.  Table 
1.29 reports results from regressing an indicator for each behavior (enrollment, leaving 
school to take a job, leaving school for financial reasons, and moving across state 
lines) on an indicator for a current state unemployment rate of 9% or higher among 
school-leaving age men (13 to 28 years).  Results are consistent if a lagged indicator 
for a bad economy is used.  No statistically significant relationships emerge.  An 
exception is moving: men are less likely to move across state lines when the 
unemployment rate is high (17% less likely relative to the sample mean).  School-
leaving cohort (men who left school in the same year) size is compared with the 
national unemployment rate.  If school-leavers are avoiding bad economies through 
endogenous timing cohorts should be large in low unemployment years.  Table 1.30 
suggests this is not the case: two of the largest cohorts occurred in the highest 
unemployment rate years (1982, 1983).  36% of the sample left school in recessions of 
the early 1980s while 8.6% left in the low employment years of the late 1980s (1985-
1989).  Regressing school-leaving cohort size on the national unemployment rate 
reveals a positive relationship (beta=48.96, robust se=33.89): cohort size increases as 
the national unemployment rate rises.  Economic conditions at age 14 are uncorrelated 
with education or age at school-leaving (see Table 1.31), suggesting that economic 
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conditions experience during youth are not strong predictors of age or educational 
attainment at school-leaving. 
TABLE 1.29. Effect of a bad economy on enrollment, dropping out, leaving school for financial 
reasons, and migration 
 Currently 
Enrolled 
Drop  
out 
Financial  
difficulty 
Move across  
state lines 
Proportion 0.24 0.08 0.07 0.06 
Bad economy 0.002 -0.003 0.014 -0.010** 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.016) (0.004) 
Sample Full Left school Left school Full 
Observations 58193 5687 5687 60903 
Notes: All models estimated with a linear probability model and control for personal 
characteristics and state and year fixed effects.  Full sample includes all men of school-leaving 
age (13 to 28 years); left school sample includes men who left school since last interview.  
Standard errors clustered by state and reported in parentheses.  ***;**;*= statistically significant 
at the 1%; 5%; 10% confidence level. 
 
 
TABLE 1.30. School-leaving cohort size and the national unemployment rate 
Year School-leaving cohort size National unemployment rate 
1976 258 7.09 
1977 342 6.57 
1978 459 5.64 
1979 543 5.49 
1980 452 6.81 
1981 473 7.28 
1982 426 9.18 
1983 301 9.16 
1984 182 7.27 
1985 121 7.05 
1986 89 6.92 
1987 55 6.18 
1988 32 5.44 
1989 30 5.13 
1990 9 5.41 
1991 0 6.42 
1992 2 6.84 
Notes: A school-leaving cohort is a sample of men who left school in the same year. 
 
 
TABLE 1.31. Effect of a bad economy at age 14 on school-leaving age and years of education 
 School-leaving  
age 
School-leaving years  
of education 
Mean 19.04 12.77 
Bad economy 0.131 -0.025 
 (0.138) (0.103) 
N 3774 3774 
Notes: Standard errors are clustered by school-leaving state and reported in parentheses.  ***; 
**; * = statistically significant at the 1%; 5%; 10% level. 
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Taken together the published literature and analysis using the NLSY79 suggests that 
U.S. school-leaving men in the mid-1970s to late 1980s did not substantially alter 
school-leaving time or location through enrollment, dropping out, or moving.  Nor 
were these men forced out of school in bad economies.  Interestingly, these men were 
less likely to move and school-leaving cohort sizes were larger when the 
unemployment rate was high.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
DOES LEAVING SCHOOL IN A BAD ECONOMY AFFECT HEALTH 
BEHAVIOR MARKERS? 
 
 
Johanna Catherine Maclean21 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study tests the persistent effect of macroeconomic fluctuations at leaving school 
on three markers of health behavior: smoking, binge drinking, and obesity.   Data are 
drawn from the geocoded National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohort. I 
exploit macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving between 1976 and 1995 to 
identify effects.  I proxy macroeconomic fluctuations with the state unemployment 
rate.  I find that leaving school when the state unemployment rate is high leads to an 
increase in the probability of binge drinking and a decrease in the probability of 
obesity in middle age.  Health behavior marker effects are concentrated among college 
educated men.  Supplementary analyses document career and marriage outcomes as 
potential mechanisms.  These findings suggest an unanticipated consequence of the 
2007-09 recession: increased binge drinking and lower body weight among the current 
cohort of school leaving men.  
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I. Introduction 
This study estimates the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations at school 
leaving on three markers of health behavior: smoking, binge drinking, and obesity.  
Several empirical patterns motivate this study: leaving school when the unemployment 
rate is high has negative career and health effects; individual career outcomes and 
health are correlated; and macroeconomic fluctuations affect health.  I proxy 
macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving with the state unemployment rate.  I 
compare health behavior markers at middle age of those who left school when the 
unemployment rate was high with those who left school when the unemployment rate 
is low.  I use macroeconomic fluctuations between 1976 and 1995 to identify 
persistent health behavior marker effects.   
Despite receiving substantial research and policy attention, rates of smoking, 
binge drinking, and obesity remain above nationally stated objectives (USHHS, 2010).  
As documented in Table 2.1, these health behavior markers are associated with 
631,000 deaths and $236 billion (2008 dollars) in health care costs annually.  21.8% of 
Americans smoke22 (MMWR, 2010) and smoking is the leading cause of preventable 
death and disease in the United States (MMWR, 2010; USHHS, 2010).  14.3% of 
adults report binge drinking23 in the past 30 days (Naimi, et al, 2003).  Binge drinking 
is defined by the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (NIAAA) as a 
pattern of drinking that brings an individual’s blood alcohol concentration to 0.08 
gram percent or more (NIAAA, 2004).  Consuming five [four] or more alcoholic 
                                                 
22 Smokers are defined as adults aged >=18 who reported having smoked >=100 cigarettes in their 
lifetime and now smoke every day or some days (MMWR, 2010).  
23 Drinking 5 [4) or more drinks in one drinking session for men [women]. 
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drinks within two hours for men [women] generates this level of blood alcohol 
concentration for the average adult.  Binge drinking is associated with injuries, alcohol 
poisoning, sexually transmitted diseases, cardiovascular diseases, liver disease, 
unintended pregnancies, and impaired driving (Naimi, et al, 2003).  Recent data 
suggests that 35.5% of men and 35.8% of women are obese24 (Flegal et al, 2012).  
Obesity is associated with morbidity, mortality, poor labor market outcomes, and 
increased health care costs (Cawley, 2004; Malnick & Knobler, 2006; Flegal et al, 
2007; Dixon, 2010; Cawley & Meyerhoefer, 2012).  Understanding determinants of 
smoking, binge drinking, and obesity is important for effective health policy, 
containing future health care costs, and improving population health.  
TABLE 2.1.  Deaths and health care costs attributable to health behavior markers 
Health behavior marker  Annual deaths Annual health care costs 
(2008 dollars)  
Smoking 443,0001 $79 B4 
Binge drinking 76,0002 $10 B5 
Obesity 112,0003 $147B6 
1Adhikari et al (2008); 2Midanik et al (2004); 3Flegal et al (2005); 4Miller et al (1999); 5USDHHS 
(2000); 6Finkelstein et al (2009). 
 
My findings imply that leaving school when the state unemployment rate is 
high increases the probability of binge drinking and decreases the probability of 
obesity in middle age.  Consistent with labor studies that document large, negative 
career effects for high skill (college graduates, MBAs, PhDs) men, health behavior 
marker effects are concentrated among college educated men.  My preferred 
specification implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the state unemployment rate 
at school leaving leads to a 2.8 percentage point increase in the probability of binge 
                                                 
24 Obesity is defined as a Body Mass Index (BMI) of 30 or more.  BMI=(weight in pounds)*703/(height 
in inches)^2.   
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drinking and a 5.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of obesity at middle 
age among college educated men.  This affect is observed 17 to 33 years after leaving 
school when men are 43 to 51 years old.  I find no evidence that the state 
unemployment rate at school leaving affects women’s health behavior markers.  This 
non-result is consistent with labor studies that document no association between 
macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving and career outcomes among women 
(Kondo, 2007; Hershbein, 2012).  Supplementary analyses suggest that the net effect 
may operate through career and marriage outcomes.  Men that leave school when the 
state unemployment rate is high work fewer weeks per year, are less likely to be 
satisfied with their job, are less likely to have flexible work hours, and are less likely 
to be married in middle age than their counterparts who leave school when the state 
unemployment rate is low.  Results are robust to various econometric techniques, 
including instrumental variables that account for the potential endogeneity of the time 
and location of school leaving.  My findings suggest that college educated men in the 
current cohort of school-leavers are persistently more likely to binge drink, but less 
likely to be obese, in middle age than college educated men in adjacent cohorts.   
This paper is structured as follows.  Section II reports the conceptual 
framework.  The empirical model and data are described in Section III and Section IV 
reports results.  Robustness checks are reported in Section V and Section VI 
concludes. 
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II. Conceptual Framework 
This section reviews several lines of research that link macroeconomic 
fluctuations at school leaving with health behavior markers.  Labor studies document 
that workers who leave school in a bad economy have persistently worse career 
outcomes and effects are concentrated among high skill (college graduates, MBAs, 
PhDs) men (Oyer, 2006; 2008; Kahn, 2010; Genda et al, 2011; Oreopolous et al, 
2012).  Frictions in the labor market prevent workers from shifting to a better job 
when the economy rebounds.  I employ a broad definition of labor market frictions: 
any deviation from perfect worker mobility between jobs.  In a spot market only 
contemporary shocks affect career outcomes while frictions (e.g., imperfect 
information, signaling, implicit contracts, internal labor markets, human capital 
accumulation) suggest that leaving school when the state unemployment rate is high 
may persistently affect outcomes.  See Baker et al (1994), Oyer (2006; 2008), or Kahn 
(2010) for a comprehensive review of labor market frictions.  Kahn (2010), using the 
same data analyzed in the current paper (NLSY79), finds that a 1 percentage point 
increase in the school leaving unemployment rate leads to a 2.5-9% lower wage up to 
15 years later among white male college graduates.  Economic theory and empirical 
evidence imply that as income rises, all else equal, the demand for health will increase 
(Grossman, 1972; Duleep, 1986).  Workers who leave school when the state 
unemployment rate is high are predicted to have worse health than their counterparts 
who leave when the state unemployment rate is low.   
Low-quality jobs may lack benefits because working conditions are correlated 
within jobs.  For example, small firms that do not offer health insurance are less likely 
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to offer worksite health promotion [exercise, nutrition, blood pressure monitoring, off 
the job accident reduction] programs (Kenkel & Supina, 1992).  Workers who leave 
school when the state unemployment rate is high may obtain jobs that provide fewer 
fringe benefits.  Public health research implies that workplace health promotion 
programs can be effective in helping workers quit smoking, reduce problematic 
alcohol use, and lose weight (Anderson et al, 2009; Webb et al, 2009; Leeks et al, 
2010).  If workers who leave school when the state unemployment rate is high 
systematically lack access to workplace health promotion programs, they may 
experience worse health behavior markers.  Although the results are not entirely 
consistent, the displaced worker literature highlights the health effects of job loss: in 
addition to lower earnings losing a job leads to mortality, smoking, binge drinking, 
and obesity (Jacobson et al, 1993; Gallo et al, 2000; Strully, 2009; Sullivan & von 
Wachter, 2009; Deb et al, 2011).  Using administrative data, Sullivan and von Wachter 
(2009) find that job loss due to plant closure leads to loss in life expectancy of 1.0–1.5 
years for a worker displaced at age 40.  Features of employment are associated with 
health, even after conditioning on income.  For example, Courtemarche (2009) links 
long work hours with high body weight, Fletcher et al (2010) find that cumulative 
exposure to physically demanding work in harmful working conditions leads to lower 
self-reported health, and Fischer and Sousa-Poza (2009) associate job satisfaction with 
self-reported health.   
Leaving school in a when the state unemployment rate is high may affect 
health behavior markers through marriage and education.  These outcomes are 
negatively associated with substance use (Gardner & Oswald, 2004; Fuchs, 2004; 
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Heinz et al, 2009; Cutler & Lleras-Muney, 2010; Cutler et al, 2011), although 
marriage may be positively associated with body weight (Averett et al, 2008).  A 
worker who leaves school in when the state unemployment rate is high and obtains a 
low paying job may have poor marriage market opportunities.  He may decide to delay 
or forego marriage.  Becker (1981) shows that career outcomes are stronger 
determinants for male marriage market opportunities than for female opportunities, 
thus the marriage mechanism may be stronger for men than women.  Workers who 
leave school when the state unemployment rate is high may seek out education as 
lower wages reduce the opportunity cost of education or alternatively they may be 
unable to finance education with lower earnings.  Although health economics theory 
implies a causal relationship between education and health (Grossman, 1972), recent 
empirical research provides mixed support for an education-health relationship (de 
Walgue, 2007; Grimard & Parent; 2007; Clark & Royer, 2010; Etile & Jones, 2011).   
Economists are increasingly interested in 'sensitive' periods of development: 
some skills or traits are most easily acquired at specific developmental stages 
(Knudsen et al, 2006; Heckman, 2007; Almond & Currie, 2011).  Although much of 
the economics literature focuses on the importance of early childhood (0 to 5 years), 
neuroscience research shows that typical school leaving ages (mid-teens to mid-20s) 
may be a sensitive period for emotional and self-regulation development: prefrontal 
cortex development occurs at this stage and this region of the brain governs emotion 
and self-regulation (Dahl, 2004).  Health shocks received during this period may have 
persistent effects.  
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Although much of the literature suggests that individuals who leave school 
when the unemployment rate is high are more likely to smoke, binge drink, and be 
obese, several studies with counter-intuitive findings call to question the direction of 
the relationship.  An active line of research suggests that health behavior markers 
improve when the state unemployment rate rises (Ruhm, 2003; 2005; Ruhm & Black, 
2002).  Work by Ettner (1996) implies that income is positively associated with 
alcohol use.  Studies that use the Social Security Notch, Earned Income Tax Credit, or 
inheritances as exogenous sources of variation in income show no, or a negative, 
relationship between income and health behavior markers (Schmeiser, 2009; Cawley 
et al, 2010; Kim & Ruhm, 2012).  Bhattacharya & Sood (2005) note that if health 
insurance premiums do not risk adjust for body weight, access to health insurance may 
lead to increases in the prevalence of obesity.  Thus, while the literature suggests 
leaving school in when the unemployment rate is high may lead to smoking, binge 
drinking, and obesity, the direction and magnitude of the relationship is an empirical 
question.   
 
III. Empirical Model and Data 
This study takes a standard health production function as a starting point (e.g., 
Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1983).  Health is produced using market (e.g., medical care) 
and non-market (e.g., exercise) inputs.  Consumers are endowed with a health stock 
and value health and other goods.  They make consumption decisions to maximize 
utility given preferences, prices, the budget set, and the health production function.  
Recently, economists have extended this framework by building in sensitive 
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developmental periods: health shocks received during such periods persistently affect 
health (Knudsen, et al, 2006; Heckman, 2007; Almond & Currie, 2011).  These 
extensions capture the developmental importance of school leaving age identified by 
neuroscience research (Dahl, 2004).  Features of these models guide my empirical 
analysis.   
I take a reduced form approach rather than estimate a full structural model that 
specifies all causal pathways from macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving to 
health behavior markers in middle age.  I exploit a quasi-experiment, macroeconomic 
fluctuations between 1976 and 1995 and variation across states, to identify net effects.  
My primary objective is to estimate the total effect of macroeconomic fluctuations at 
leaving school on health behavior markers in middle age, not the partial effect after 
conditioning on career outcomes, marital status, and other endogenous health 
determinants.  In the preferred specifications, I control only for arguably exogenous 
and predetermined variables.  One interpretation of the parameter estimates is the 
effect after school-leavers make endogenous decisions about employment, marriage, 
education, and other health behavior marker determinants.  In a later section I 
investigate potential mechanisms.   
I estimate the following health production to model health behavior markers as 
a function of macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving: 
Hit = α0 + α1Ui + Xitα2 + Siα3 + Diα4 + εit   (1) 
Hit  is a health behavior marker (smoking, binge drinking, or obesity) for 
individual i in time t.  The key explanatory variable is Ui, a measure of 
macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving (proxied by the state unemployment 
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rate).  I compare the health behavior markers in middle age of respondents who left 
school when the state unemployment rate was high with those who left school when 
the state unemployment rate was low.  Xit is a vector of personal characteristics for 
individual i in year t.  Si and Di are school leaving state and year fixed effects.  εit is the 
error term.  Inclusion of state fixed effects implies that within state variation in the 
unemployment rate is used to identify effects while year fixed effects capture national 
trends in macroeconomic fluctuations.  The key identifying assumption is presented in 
Equation (2): 
Cov(Ui,εit|Xit,Si,Di)=0  (2) 
In words, the state unemployment rate at school leaving are uncorrelated with 
the error term in the structural equation after conditioning on personal characteristics 
and various fixed effects.  I estimate the health behavior marker equations with 
weighted linear probability models  and cluster standard errors by the school leaving 
state25.   
I draw data from the geocoded National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 
(NLSY79).  The NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample consisting of 12,686 
youth ages 14 to 22 in 1979.  Excluding subsamples dropped by the NLSY79 (military 
sample in 1984 and low income white sample in 1991) leaves 9,964 eligible 
respondents.  Respondents are interviewed annually between 1979 and 1994, and 
biennially from 1994 onwards.  The most recently available round was fielded in 
2008.  To focus on the persistent effects of macroeconomic fluctuations at school 
leaving, I examine health behaviors in the 2008 round when respondents are middle 
                                                 
25 Unweighted results are consistent with weighted results and are available upon request.  Similarly, 
clustering at the school leaving state/year level produces consistent standard error estimates.   
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aged (43 to 51 years).  I exclude observations with missing school leaving information 
or that were never enrolled in school.  I retain observations that left school between 
age 15 and age 30.  Because I use state unemployment rates from the BLS to proxy 
macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving and these data are available from 1976 
and onward, I exclude those who left school prior to 1976.  The analysis sample 
includes 4000 men and 4132 women.  Results are robust to alternative sample 
selection rules and are available on request.  
The NLSY79 is well suited to my research objectives.  I am able to examine 
three health behavior markers: smoking, binge drinking, and obesity.  The timing of 
the NLSY79 allows me to estimate persistent effects; respondents are 43 to 51 years of 
age and have been out of school for 17 to 33 years in 2008.  The education history and 
geocodes allow me to locate the exact state, month, and year of school leaving and 
take advantage of monthly variation in unemployment rates.  The NLSY79 is a 
longitudinal survey and offers a substantial advantage over cross-sectional surveys: 
cross-sectional data typically do not include school leaving time or location.  
Researchers must impute this information, introducing measurement error (Genda et 
al, 2010).  The detailed labor market and demographic histories allow me to analyze 
potential mechanisms.  The rich personal information allows me to control for a 
comprehensive set of covariates.  The NLSY79 has notable limitations: small sample 
size and self-reported health measures (Rowland, 1990; Brener et al, 2003).   
Figure 2.1 presents the quasi-experiment: the seasonally adjusted national 
unemployment rate is plotted between 1976 and 1995.  The school leaving period 
covers more than a full business cycle and provides substantial variation in 
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macroeconomic fluctuations.  The U.S. experienced three recessions (a mild recession 
in 1980, a severe recession between July 1982 and November 1983, and a moderate 
recession between July 1990 and March 1991) and two periods of economic growth 
(late-1980s and mid-1990s).  States were differentially impacted by these events: bars 
indicate the annual minimum and maximum state unemployment rates.  One 
interpretation of this figure is that the period between 1976 and 1995 provides 
sufficient variation in the macroeconomic fluctuations to identify effects.   
FIGURE 2.1. National and high/low state unemployment rates: 1976-1995 
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Notes: Data are drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Historical Unemployment 
Rate data series (series number LNS14000000).   
 
The dependent variables in this study are past 30 day smoking, past 30 day 
binge drinking (6 or more alcoholic drinks in one drinking session)26, and obesity 
(body mass index [BMI]≥30; BMI=[weight in pounds*703]/[height in inches]^2).  
                                                 
26 The NLSY79 measure of binge drinking differs from  the NIAAA definition: 6 or more drinks per 
drinking session vs 4 [5] drinks in 2 hours for men [women].   
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Height and weight information is self-reported in the NLSY79.  Because such self-
reports are known to contain substantial measurement error (Rowland, 1990), I 
construct predicted BMI from self-reported weight and height (Cawley, 2004; Cawley 
& Burkhauser, 2006).  Results using self-reports are consistent and are available on 
request.  
Although no there is no single best measure of economic activity, the state 
unemployment rate provides a reasonable proxy.  It is one of the variables used by the 
NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee (2010) to date economic expansions and 
contractions.27  The unemployment rate is easily understood, as the rate increases a 
smaller percentage of people are employed, and it is commonly used to measure 
economic activity in empirical research (e.g., Ruhm, 2003; Kahn, 2010).  Monthly 
unemployment data at the state level are available from the BLS from 1976 onwards.  
To capture non-linearities in the relationship between economic conditions at school 
leaving and later health behavior markers, I create an indicator of a state 
unemployment rate of 9% or higher.  Maclean (2012) finds that this level of 
unemployment is associated with particularly poor health.  The sample average school 
leaving state unemployment rate is 7.52, and 19.7% of my sample left school in a bad 
economy.   
I include both graduates and drop outs in the school leaving definition.  I am 
interested in the first period of school leaving, this occurs once for each respondent.  I 
                                                 
27 The NBER Business Cycle Dating Committee considers GDP, GDI, manufacturing and trade sales, 
industrial production, income, hours worked, and employment (NBER, 2010).  Many of these measures 
are not available by state.  Measuring school leaving economic conditions with per capita income, male 
unemployment rate, employment growth rates, and employment-to-population rates produced consistent 
results.  These results are available on request.   
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use responses to survey items asked between 1979 and 1998 on enrollment history to 
identify the month and year the respondent left school for the first time.  Non-enrolled 
respondents were asked “When were you last enrolled in regular school?  What was 
the month and year?”  I use information contained in these two items to locate the time 
of school leaving.  Respondents are allowed to return to school and remain in the 
sample.  Next, I use the geocodes to determine the state of school leaving.  
Respondents who left school between 1976 and 1978 are assigned the 1979 interview 
state.  This imputation assumes that individuals do not move across state lines between 
school leaving and 1979.  Violation of this assumption induces measurement error, but 
only 5.6% of school leaving age respondents (ages 15 to 30 years) report a between 
state move in the past year in the NLSY79.   The interview state is assigned to 
respondents who left school in 1979 and thereafter.  In a sensitivity check I replace the 
interview state with the college state (when different) for college attenders.  Results 
are consistent and available on request. 
The regression models include measures of demographics (race/ethnicity, birth 
outside the U.S, school leaving age and highest grade completed); family background 
(parental education, access to cultural materials [magazines, newspapers, library cars], 
number of siblings); a proxy for ability (Armed Forces Qualification Test [AFQT] 
score), school leaving state and year fixed effects; and time since school leaving.  I 
include indicators for missing covariates and assign missing observations the sample 
mean (continuous) or mode (binary). 
Weighted summary statistics for men (women) are reported in Table 2.2 (Table 
2.3).  The prevalence of past 30 day smoking, past 30 day binge drinking, and obesity 
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are 26%, 22%, and 36% among men.  The prevalence rates among women are 25%, 
8.7%, and 34%.  Both men and women have been out of school an average of 28 years 
and on average left school at age 19. 
TABLE 2.2. Weighted summary statistics, men 
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Smoke 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Binge 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Obese 0.36 0.48 0 1 
School leaving UE rate 7.52 2.30 2.60 17.9 
Time since school leaving 28.4 3.15 15 33 
School leaving year 1980.6 3.15 1976 1994 
School leaving age 19.2 2.60 15 30 
Less than high school 0.16 0.36 0 1 
High school 0.47 0.50 0 1 
Some college 0.16 0.37 0 1 
College graduate 0.21 0.41 0 1 
White 0.81 0.39 0 1 
Hispanic 0.056 0.23 0 1 
Black 0.14 0.34 0 1 
AFQT 50.1 28.9 1 99 
Foreign born 0.033 0.18 0 1 
Mother's education 11.8 2.57 0 20 
Mother's education missing 0.049 0.22 0 1 
Father's education 12.1 3.34 0 20 
Father's education missing 0.092 0.29 0 1 
Magazines 0.69 0.46 0 1 
Magazines missing 0.0069 0.083 0 1 
Library card 0.76 0.43 0 1 
Library card missing 0.0028 0.053 0 1 
Newspapers 0.86 0.35 0 1 
Newspaper missing 0.0022 0.047 0 1 
Siblings 3.16 2.22 0 22 
Siblings missing 0.00032 0.018 0 1 
Observations 4000    
Notes: Summary statistics are weighted using NLSY79 survey weights.  
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TABLE 2.3. Weighted summary statistics, women 
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Smoke 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Binge 0.087 0.28 0 1 
Obese 0.34 0.47 0 1 
School leaving UE rate 7.50 2.30 2.10 17.9 
Time since school leaving 28.6 3.08 14 33 
School leaving year 1980.4 3.08 1976 1995 
School leaving age 18.9 2.41 15 30 
Less than high school 0.13 0.33 0 1 
High school 0.46 0.50 0 1 
Some college 0.21 0.41 0 1 
College graduate 0.20 0.40 0 1 
White 0.80 0.40 0 1 
Hispanic 0.057 0.23 0 1 
Black 0.14 0.35 0 1 
AFQT 49.2 27.0 1 99 
Foreign born 0.035 0.18 0 1 
Mother's education 11.7 2.63 0 20 
Mother's education missing 0.040 0.20 0 1 
Father's education 11.9 3.37 0 20 
Father's education missing 0.095 0.29 0 1 
Magazines 0.68 0.46 0 1 
Magazines missing 0.0048 0.069 0 1 
Library card 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Library card missing 0.0044 0.066 0 1 
Newspapers 0.84 0.36 0 1 
Newspaper missing 0.0039 0.063 0 1 
Siblings 3.30 2.24 0 19 
Siblings missing 0.0015 0.039 0 1 
Observations 4132    
Notes: Summary statistics are weighted using NLSY79 survey weights. 
 
IV. Results 
My preferred results are reported in Tables 2.4 to 2.6.  Table 2.4 reports results 
for the full sample.  The top panel reports results for all men and the bottom panel 
reports results for all women.  Each cell represents a parameter estimate from a 
separate regression.  Models that proxy macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving 
with the state unemployment rate and an indicator for a state unemployment rate of 
9% or higher are estimated.  In all regressions, the parameter estimates are small and 
indistinguishable from zero.  This finding is not surprising: labor studies document 
career effects among high skill men.  Combining men of different skill levels may 
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mask relationships between macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving and health 
behavior markers in middle age.  
TABLE 2.4. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on health behavior markers full sample 
 Smoke Binge Obese 
Men    
Proportion 0.26 0.22 0.36 
Unemployment rate 0.0004 0.0022 -0.0093 
 (0.0074) (0.0056) (0.0103) 
Unemployment rate ≥ 9 0.0207 -0.0005 -0.0450 
 (0.0272) (0.0269) (0.0359) 
N 3072 3067 3058 
Women    
Proportion 0.25 0.08 0.34 
Unemployment rate -0.0059 0.0027 -0.0065 
 (0.0091) (0.0047) (0.0069) 
Unemployment rate ≥ 9 -0.0223 0.0125 -0.0225 
 (0.0324) (0.0193) (0.0216) 
N 3358 3353 3232 
Notes: All regressions estimated with a weighted linear probability model and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, school leaving year fixed 
effects, and school leaving state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the school 
leaving state and are reported in parentheses.  ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero 
at the 1%; 5%; and 10% confidence level. 
 
Because I find no effects for women, I focus on men in the remainder of the 
paper.  These non-results are consistent with studies that document no association 
between macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving and career outcomes among 
women (Kondo, 2007; Hershbein, 2012).  Women’s labor market participation 
patterns are historically different from men’s patterns.  Figure 2.2 reports labor market 
participation for men and women between 1976 and 2010.  In 1976, 48% of women 
ages 18 to 54 years participated in the labor market while 78% of men ages 18 to 54 
years participated.  Women in this cohort may have been less attached to the labor 
market than men and may have a different set of opportunities outside the labor 
market (e.g., home production, child rearing).   
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FIGURE 2.2. Labor force participation by sex: 1976-2010 
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Notes: Data are drawn from a special request by the author from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (Data on Employment Status by State and Demographic Group).   
 
Table 2.5 reports regression results by skill level.  I stratify men into “high 
skill” (a college degree or higher at school leaving) and “low skill” (less than a college 
degree at school leaving).  Labor studies document that the career effects of leaving 
school when the state unemployment rate is high are concentrated among high skill 
(college graduates, MBAs, PhDs) men.  Consistent with labor studies, I find that high 
skill men who leave school when the state unemployment rate is high are more likely 
to binge drink and less likely to be obese than their counter parts who leave school 
when the state unemployment rate is low in middle age.  A 1 percentage point increase 
in the school state unemployment rate is associated with a 2.77 percentage point 
increase in the probability of binge drinking and a 5.7 percentage point decrease in the 
probability of obesity by middle age among college educated men.  Relative to the 
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sample mean, these parameter estimates imply a 17% increase in the probability of 
binge drinking and a 22.4% decrease in the probability of obesity.  Results are 
consistent in specifications that include an indicator for a leaving school when the 
state unemployment rate is ≥ 9%.  Table 2.5 reports results by race/ethnicity: white 
men vs. non-white men.  No clear pattern between the state unemployment rate at 
school leaving and health behavior markers in middle age emerges.  The parameter 
estimates are generally small and imprecisely estimated.   
TABLE 2.5. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on health behavior markers by skill  
 Smoke Binge Obese 
High skill men    
Proportion 0.07 0.16 0.25 
Unemployment rate -0.0086 0.0277* -0.0513** 
 (0.0113) (0.0142) (0.0218) 
Unemployment rate ≥ 9 0.0759 0.0754 -0.1351 
 (0.0533) (0.0741) (0.0820) 
N 512 512 511 
Low skill men    
Proportion 0.31 0.24 0.39 
Unemployment rate 0.0052 -0.0034 -0.0021 
 (0.0113) (0.0070) (0.0120) 
Unemployment rate ≥ 9 0.0144 -0.0234 -0.0345 
 (0.0312) (0.0294) (0.0381) 
N 2560 2555 2547 
Notes: All regressions estimated with a weighted linear probability model and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, school leaving year fixed 
effects, and school leaving state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the school 
leaving state and are reported in parentheses.   ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero 
at the 1%; 5%; and 10% confidence level. 
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TABLE 2.6. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on health behavior markers by 
race/ethnicity 
 Smoke Binge Obese 
White men    
Proportion 0.24 0.23 0.35 
Unemployment rate 0.0008 0.0021 -0.0114 
 (0.0086) (0.0068) (0.0123) 
Unemployment rate ≥ 9 0.0208 0.0008 -0.0665 
 (0.0309) (0.0312) (0.0435) 
N 1605 1604 1599 
Non-white men    
Proportion 0.33 0.18 0.40 
Unemployment rate -0.0018 0.0015 0.0079 
 (0.0118) (0.0106) (0.0116) 
Unemployment rate ≥ 9 0.0108 -0.0097 0.0501 
 (0.0477) (0.0374) (0.0442) 
N 1467 1463 1459 
Notes: All regressions estimated with a weighted linear probability model and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, school leaving year fixed 
effects, and school leaving state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the school 
leaving state and are reported in parentheses.  ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero 
at the 1%; 5%; and 10% confidence level. 
 
To distinguish the importance of the state unemployment at school leaving 
from the contemporaneous effect of the state unemployment rate on health behavior 
markers (e.g., Ruhm, 2003, Dahve & Rashad-Kelly, 2010) I augment the preferred 
model with a lead and lag of the school leaving state unemployment rate.  Results are 
reported in Tables 2.7 (all men), 2.8 (skill level), and 2.9 (race/ethnicity).  The 
findings are broadly consistent with results generated in the preferred models.  Binge 
drinking effects are stronger in the augmented models than in the preferred models: 
parameter estimates are larger and more likely to be statistically different from zero in 
the full sample, college educated sample, and white sample.  The causal interpretation 
of the lead and lag state unemployment rate parameter estimates is not clear: I do not 
include lead or lag state and year fixed effects and the parameter estimates may suffer 
from omitted variable bias.   
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TABLE 2.7. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on health behavior markers, lag and lead 
unemployment rate 
 Smoke Binge Obese 
Proportion 0.26 0.22 0.36 
Lag unemployment rate -0.0049 -0.0113 -0.0053 
 (0.0091) (0.0097) (0.0089) 
Unemployment rate 0.0023 0.0193** -0.0096 
 (0.0120) (0.0088) (0.0138) 
Lead unemployment rate 0.0021 -0.0172** 0.0064 
 (0.0107) (0.0066) (0.0103) 
N 3072 3067 3058 
Notes: All regressions estimated with a weighted linear probability model and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, school leaving year fixed 
effects, and school leaving state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the school 
leaving state and are reported in parentheses.   ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero 
at the 1%; 5%; and 10% confidence level. 
 
TABLE 2.8. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on health behavior markers by skill, lag 
and lead unemployment rate  
 Smoke Binge Obese 
High skill men    
Proportion 0.07 0.16 0.25 
Lag unemployment rate 0.0004 -0.0112 -0.0421** 
 (0.0114) (0.0253) (0.0204) 
Unemployment rate -0.0143 0.0457* -0.0392 
 (0.0180) (0.0266) (0.0298) 
Lead unemployment rate 0.0146 -0.0299 0.0366** 
 (0.0126) (0.0195) (0.0163) 
N 512 512 511 
High skill men    
Proportion 0.31 0.24 0.39 
Lag unemployment rate -0.0045 -0.0117 -0.0034 
 (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0105) 
Unemployment rate 0.0085 0.0112 0.0022 
 (0.0165) (0.0105) (0.0147) 
Lead unemployment rate -0.0010 -0.0126 -0.0038 
 (0.0143) (0.0090) (0.0137) 
N 2560 2555 2547 
Notes: All regressions estimated with a weighted linear probability model and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, school leaving year fixed 
effects, and school leaving state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the school 
leaving state and are reported in parentheses.   ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero 
at the 1%; 5%; and 10% confidence level. 
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TABLE 2.9. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on health behavior markers by 
race/ethnicity, lag and lead unemployment rate 
 Smoke Binge Obese 
White men    
Proportion 0.24 0.23 0.35 
Lag unemployment rate -0.0020 -0.0120 -0.0076 
 (0.0108) (0.0114) (0.0109) 
Unemployment rate 0.0026 0.0195* -0.0091 
 (0.0138) (0.0105) (0.0175) 
Lead unemployment rate -0.0010 -0.0169* 0.0047 
 (0.0133) (0.0094) (0.0119) 
N 1605 1604 1599 
Non-white men    
Proportion 0.33 0.18 0.40 
Lag unemployment rate -0.0132 -0.0119 -0.0032 
 (0.0086) (0.0102) (0.0181) 
Unemployment rate 0.0007 0.0175 0.0002 
 (0.0164) (0.0135) (0.0154) 
Lead unemployment rate 0.0090 -0.0171* 0.0175 
 (0.0140) (0.0099) (0.0157) 
N 1467 1463 1459 
Notes: All regressions estimated with a weighted linear probability model and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, school leaving year fixed 
effects, and school leaving state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the school 
leaving state and are reported in parentheses.   ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero 
at the 1%; 5%; and 10% confidence level. 
 
The second objective of this paper is to shed light on potential mechanisms 
between the state unemployment rate at school leaving and health behavior markers in 
middle age.  The net relationship is expected to operate, at least partially, through 
career outcomes, marriage, and education.  I construct career (probability of 
employment, number of weeks worked in the past year, hourly wage, job satisfaction, 
flexible work hours28), marriage and fertility (marital status, presence of children), and 
education outcomes (difference between education at school leaving and survey date).  
In separate equations I model each potential mechanism as a function of the state 
unemployment rate at school leaving, demographics, family background, and school 
leaving state and year fixed effects.  To preserve space I do not report results that 
                                                 
28 Employment pertains to all jobs while hourly wage, job satisfaction, and flexible work hours pertain 
to the first listed job.  A full description of the variables is available upon request.  
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proxy macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving with an indicator for a state 
unemployment rate of 9% or higher.  Results are consistent and are available on 
request.  If these outcomes are potential mechanisms the outcomes should be predicted 
by the school leaving state unemployment rate.  Results are reported in Table 2.10 
(career outcomes) and Table 2.11 (marriage, fertility, and education outcomes).   
TABLE 2.10. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on labor market outcomes, various 
samples 
 Employed Weeks 
worked 
Hourly  
wage 
Satisfied  
with job 
Flexible  
Work hours 
Prop./mean 0.90 44.77 28.85 0.93 0.54 
All men -0.0031 -0.3512 -0.7181 -0.0087* -0.0061 
 (0.0050) (0.2630) (0.5342) (0.0048) (0.0078) 
N 3049 3072 2642 2784 2366 
Prop./mean 0.97 49.41 48.54 0.95 0.68 
High skill -0.0078 -0.9062** 2.3937 -0.0323** -0.0619*** 
 (0.0082) (0.4482) (2.0443) (0.0148) (0.0193) 
N 507 512 472 501 441 
Prop./mean 0.89 43.49 23.13 0.92 0.49 
Low skill -0.0027 -0.2395 -0.8281* -0.0020 -0.0034 
 (0.0065) (0.3199) (0.4606) (0.0044) (0.0103) 
N 2542 2560 2170 2283 1925 
Prop./mean 0.93 46.35 30.52 0.93 0.54 
White 0.0013 -0.1074 -0.5701 -0.0093* -0.0085 
 (0.0051) (0.2857) (0.5819) (0.0052) (0.0091) 
N 1592 1605 1462 1522 1306 
Prop./mean 0.81 38.33 21.08 0.93 0.51 
Non-white -0.0037 -0.4603 -1.3104** -0.0106 0.0007 
 (0.0109) (0.5311) (0.6105) (0.0082) (0.0194) 
N 1457 1467 1180 1262 1060 
Notes: All regressions estimated with a weighted linear probability model and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, school leaving year fixed 
effects, and school leaving state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the school 
leaving state and are reported in parentheses.   ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero 
at the 1%; 5%; and 10% confidence level. 
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TABLE 2.11. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on social outcomes, various samples 
 Married Children Additional 
schooling 
Proportion/mean 0.64 1.60 0.36 
All men -0.0211** -0.0256 -0.0005 
 (0.0088) (0.0184) (0.0057) 
N 3072 4000 4000 
Proportion/mean 0.79 1.62 0.29 
High skill men 0.0112 0.0273 -0.0106 
 (0.0223) (0.0784) (0.0168) 
N 512 647 647 
Proportion/mean 0.60 1.60 0.38 
Low skill men -0.0255** -0.0263 0.0015 
 (0.0116) (0.0161) (0.0068) 
N 2560 3353 3353 
Proportion/mean 0.69 1.54 0.35 
White men -0.0157 -0.0032 -0.0049 
 (0.0112) (0.0288) (0.0077) 
N 1605 2121 2121 
Proportion/mean 0.45 1.86 0.39 
Non-white men -0.0203* -0.0726 0.0072 
 (0.0110) (0.0534) (0.0108) 
N 1467 1879 1879 
Notes: All regressions estimated with a weighted linear probability model and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, school leaving year fixed 
effects, and school leaving state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the school 
leaving state and are reported in parentheses.   ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero 
at the 1%; 5%; and 10% confidence level. 
 
The state unemployment rate at school leaving is associated with worse career 
and marriage, but not education, outcomes in middle age.  Consistent with labor 
studies that document the largest career effects of leaving school when the state 
unemployment rate is high among high skill workers, I find the largest effects among 
college educated men.  College educated men who leave school when the state 
unemployment rate is high work fewer weeks per year, are less likely to be satisfied 
with their job, and are less likely to have flexible work hours than their counterparts 
who leave school when the state unemployment rate is low by middle age.  I find that 
men, and this effect is driven by low skill and non-white men, who leave school with 
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the state unemployment rate is high are less likely to be married in middle age than 
their counterparts.    
 
V. Robustness Checks 
This section reports results from a series of robustness checks.  An obvious 
concern is the endogeneity of school leaving.  School-leavers may engage in 
endogenous timing (enrolling in additional schooling, dropping out, forced out for 
financial reasons) or migration (moving to a stronger labor market).  I refer to these 
behaviors collectively as endogenous sorting.  The intuition for the sign of the 
potential bias from endogenous sorting is as follows.  School-leavers who avoid bad 
economies have characteristics (ability, financial resources, forethought) that permit 
avoidance behavior.  These characteristics are arguably negatively correlated with 
smoking, binge drinking, and obesity.  The rich background information contained in 
the NLSY79 allows me to control, at least partially, for these characteristics.  To the 
extent that characteristics remain unobservable, failure to account for them is expected 
to bias least squares estimates away from zero.29  Alternatively classical measurement 
error in the school leaving variables, a familiar feature of survey data, will attenuate 
least squares estimates towards zero.  If measurement error is not classical, the sign of 
the bias is ambiguous.  It is not clear a priori which effect will dominate. 
                                                 
29 Assume the true model takes the following form: H_40is=α0 + α1Uis + α2Cis; α1<0; α2>0.  Cis is scalar 
that captures characteristics that allow avoidance behavior and are positively associated with age 40 
health.  The estimated model can be written as H_40is=β0 + β1Uis; β1 <0.  The association between 
omitted and included regressor takes the form Cis=γ0 + γ1Uis; γ1<0.  The omitted variable formula 
implies β1 = α1 + γ1 * α2; γ1 * α2 <0: least squares estimates are biased away from zero. 
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Table 2.12 reports a basic test for endogenous sorting: covariate balance.  The 
sample is split between men who left school with a state unemployment rate below or 
above the sample mean (7.52).  If school-leavers are avoiding bad economies, 
differences in observable characteristics should exist between these two groups of 
men.  Ex ante, we may expect that if positive sorting is present that observably more 
advantaged men will leave school when the unemployment rate is low.  The test of 
covariate balance do not support this hypothesis: respondents in these two groups are 
broadly similar in terms of their observable characteristics.   
TABLE 2.12. Test of covariate balance 
 School leaving state 
unemployment rate ≤ sample 
mean 
School leaving state 
unemployment rate > sample 
mean 
Time since school leaving 28.8 27.9 
School leaving year 1980.2 1981.1 
School leaving age 19.1 19.2 
Less than high school 0.18 0.12 
High school 0.47 0.47 
Some college 0.15 0.18 
College graduate 0.20 0.23 
White 0.80 0.81 
Hispanic 0.063 0.046 
Black 0.13 0.14 
AFQT 50.4 49.8 
Foreign born 0.034 0.033 
Mother's education 11.8 11.9 
Mother's education missing 0.045 0.055 
Father's education 12.1 12.1 
Father's education missing 0.090 0.094 
Magazines 0.68 0.71 
Magazines missing 0.0079 0.0056 
Library card 0.77 0.75 
Library card missing 0.0024 0.0035 
Newspapers 0.85 0.86 
Newspaper missing 0.0014 0.0033 
Siblings 3.20 3.10 
Siblings missing 0.00036 0.00025 
Observations 2376 1624 
 
I use two-stage least squares to address remaining endogeneity concerns and 
measurement error in the school leaving variables.  I predict the state unemployment 
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rate at school leaving using birth year, state of residence at age 14, and education at 
school leaving.  This IV has been used previously to predict economic conditions at 
school leaving (Kahn, 2010; Oreopoulous et al, 2012).  Men are assigned the state 
unemployment rate they would face if they left school on time (henceforth the on time 
state unemployment rate).  For example, I assign a college graduate the June (modal 
school leaving month in my sample) unemployment rate in the year he turned 22 
(modal school leaving age for college graduates in my sample) in the state of 
residence at age 14.  State of residence at age 14 is used as it is arguably exogenous to 
the school-leaver while the school leaving state is suspect.  I make similar assignments 
for all educational levels.  The compliers are school-leavers who do not adjust their 
educational plans in response to the contemporaneous state unemployment rates.  
Because the time and location of school leaving is potentially endogenous, the time 
since school leaving is potentially endogenous.  I instrument time since school leaving 
with the on time since school leaving variables: the survey year (2008) minus the on 
time school leaving year.  The school leaving state and year fixed effects are replaced 
with age 14 state fixed effects and on time year fixed effects.  Standard errors are 
clustered by the age 14 state of residence.   
The key identifying assumption in this model is that, after conditioning on 
personal characteristics and various fixed effects, the IV is correctly excludable from 
the health production function.  This assumption is difficult to test statistically.  In 
unreported analyses, I regress the IV on all other covariates.  The covariates are 
generally not strong predictors of the IV.  One interpretation of this simple test is that 
the IV is uncorrelated with unobservables in the error term of the structural equation.   
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The IV must predict the endogenous regressor to consistently estimate a local 
average treatment effect for the compliers.  Table 2.13 presents results from first-stage 
regressions: I regress the school leaving unemployment rate on the IV and covariates 
using least squares.  To preserve space, I report regressions that measure 
macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving with the state unemployment rate.  
Results using the indicator for a state unemployment rate of 9% or higher are 
consistent and available on request.  The IV is strong: the F-statistics range from 51.80 
to 350.13, well above the convention of 10 (Stock et al, 2002).  A 1 percentage point 
increase in the on time state unemployment rate is associated with a 0.4552 to 0.6400 
percentage point increase school leaving state unemployment rate.   
TABLE 2.13. Effect of IV on state unemployment rate at school-leaving 
 All High skill Low skill White Non-white 
Mean 7.52 7.62 7.48 7.54 7.39 
On time unemployment  0.5627*** 0.6400*** 0.5694*** 0.6164*** 0.4552*** 
rate (0.0323) (0.0889) (0.0449) (0.0329) (0.0571) 
F-statistic 303.64 51.80 160.90 350.13 63.567 
N 3072 512 2560 1605 1467 
Notes: All regressions estimated with weighted least squares and control for demographics, 
family background, time since school leaving, on time year fixed effects, and on time state 
fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the on time state and are reported in 
parentheses.   ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero at the 1%; 5%; and 10% 
confidence level. 
 
IV results are reported in Tables 2.14 (all men), 2.15 (skill level), and 2.16 
(race/ethnicity).  The IV results are smaller in magnitude and less likely to be 
statistically different from zero than the preferred specification results.  The wide 
standard errors cannot rule out parameter estimates that are similar in magnitude to 
those estimated in the preferred specifications.  The IV model uses less variation in 
unemployment rates than least squares, which may account for the reduced precision.   
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TABLE 2.14. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on health behavior markers, IV model 
 Smoke Binge Obese 
Men    
Proportion 0.26 0.22 0.36 
Unemployment rate 0.0157 0.0086 -0.0120 
 (0.0211) (0.0116) (0.0106) 
N 3072 3067 3058 
Notes: All regressions estimated with weighted two-stage least squares and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, on time year fixed effects, and 
on time state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the on time state and are 
reported in parentheses.   ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero at the 1%; 5%; and 
10% confidence level. 
 
 
TABLE 2.15. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on health behavior markers by skill, IV 
model 
 Smoke Binge Obese 
High skill men    
Proportion 0.07 0.16 0.25 
Unemployment rate -0.0310 0.0023 -0.0132 
 (0.0201) (0.0349) (0.0261) 
N 512 512 511 
Low skill men    
Proportion 0.31 0.24 0.39 
Unemployment rate 0.0144 0.0038 -0.0144 
 (0.0134) (0.0122) (0.0140) 
N 2560 2555 2547 
Notes: All regressions estimated with weighted two-stage least squares and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, on time year fixed effects, and 
on time state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the on time state and are 
reported in parentheses.   ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero at the 1%; 5%; and 
10% confidence level. 
 
TABLE. 2.16. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on health behavior markers by 
race/ethnicity, IV model 
 Smoke Binge Obese 
White men    
Proportion 0.24 0.23 0.35 
Unemployment rate 0.0058 0.0117 -0.0122 
 (0.0153) (0.0138) (0.0122) 
N 1605 1604 1599 
Non-white men    
Proportion 0.33 0.18 0.40 
Unemployment rate 0.0008 0.0090 -0.0099 
 (0.0324) (0.0205) (0.0246) 
N 1467 1463 1459 
Notes: All regressions estimated with weighted two-stage least squares and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, on time year fixed effects, and 
on time state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the on time state and are 
reported in parentheses.   ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero at the 1%; 5%; and 
10% confidence level. 
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This section tests whether bias from non-random attrition is driving the 
findings.  If attritors are systematically different than completers, my results may be 
biased.  The NLSY79 retention rate was 77.8% in 2008 and I use sample weights 
which account for non-random attrition in all regressions.  I compare demographics of 
completers and attritors and re-estimate the preferred model assigning attritors 1) a 
healthy outcome and 2) an unhealthy outcome (bounding exercise).  Healthy outcomes 
are health behavior markers (smoking, binge drinking, and obesity) set to zero.  I 
define unhealthy outcomes symmetrically: health behaviors markers set to one.  Table 
2.17 reports the comparison of observable characteristics by attrition status.  I do not 
include respondents dropped by the NLSY79 for financial reasons or respondents I 
exclude from the sample due to missing variables, time since school leaving, or school 
leaving year.  These groups are broadly similar in terms of observable characteristics.  
Results reported in Tables 2.18 through 2.20 imply that estimates are robust to various 
assumptions regarding the health behavior marker status of the attritors.  One 
interpretation of these findings is that non-random attrition is not driving my results. 
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TABLE 2.17. Observable characteristics by attrition status 
 Complete Attrite 
White 0.80 0.83 
Hispanic 0.058 0.049 
Black 0.14 0.12 
AFQT 49.9 50.9 
Foreign born 0.032 0.039 
Mother's education 11.8 11.9 
Mother's education missing 0.048 0.050 
Father's education 12.1 12.1 
Father's education missing 0.090 0.097 
Magazines 0.70 0.67 
Magazines missing 0.0076 0.0049 
Library card 0.76 0.76 
Library card missing 0.0032 0.0019 
Newspapers 0.85 0.87 
Newspaper missing 0.0021 0.0024 
Siblings 3.14 3.19 
Siblings missing 0.00028 0.00044 
Observations 3092 908 
 
TABLE 2.18. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on health behavior markers, bounding 
exercise 
 Smoke Binge Obese 
Men    
Proportion 0.26 0.22 0.36 
Good health -0.0010 0.0008 -0.0083 
 (0.0052) (0.0047) (0.0079) 
Poor health 0.0011 0.0029 -0.0057 
 (0.0076) (0.0059) (0.0088) 
N 4000 4000 4000 
Notes: All regressions estimated with a weighted linear probability model and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, school leaving year fixed 
effects, and school leaving state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the school 
leaving state and are reported in parentheses.  ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero 
at the 1%; 5%; and 10% confidence level. 
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TABLE 2.19. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on health behavior markers by skill, 
bounding exercise 
 Smoke Binge Obese 
High skill men    
Proportion 0.07 0.16 0.25 
Good health -0.0062 0.0321*** -0.0332** 
 (0.0079) (0.0110) (0.0164) 
Poor health -0.0387* -0.0005 -0.0622*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0180) (0.0212) 
N 647 647 647 
Low skill men    
Proportion 0.31 0.24 0.39 
Good health 0.0022 -0.0047 -0.0040 
 (0.0080) (0.0060) (0.0090) 
Poor health 0.0093 0.0025 0.0030 
 (0.0116) (0.0073) (0.0097) 
N 3353 3353 3353 
Notes: All regressions estimated with a weighted linear probability model and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, school leaving year fixed 
effects, and school leaving state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the school 
leaving state and are reported in parentheses.  ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero 
at the 1%; 5%; and 10% confidence level. 
 
 
TABLE 2.20. Effect of school leaving unemployment rate on health behavior markers by 
race/ethnicity, bounding exercise 
 Smoke Binge Obese 
White    
Proportion 0.24 0.23 0.35 
Good health -0.0027 -0.0001 -0.0109 
 (0.0061) (0.0054) (0.0097) 
Poor health 0.0016 0.0040 -0.0062 
 (0.0093) (0.0072) (0.0099) 
N 2121 2121 2121 
Non-white    
Proportion 0.33 0.18 0.40 
Good health 0.0013 0.0010 0.0048 
 (0.0065) (0.0077) (0.0091) 
Poor health -0.0056 -0.0047 -0.0005 
 (0.0139) (0.0137) (0.0116) 
N 1879 1879 1879 
Notes: All regressions estimated with a weighted linear probability model and control for 
demographics, family background, time since school leaving, school leaving year fixed 
effects, and school leaving state fixed effects.  Standard errors are clustered around the school 
leaving state and are reported in parentheses.  ***; **; and *=statistically different from zero 
at the 1%; 5%; and 10% confidence level. 
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VI. Discussion 
 
In this study I test the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations at leaving school 
on three health behavior markers in middle age: past 30 day smoking, past 30 day 
binge drinking, and obesity.   I proxy macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving 
with the state unemployment rate.  My results imply that the state unemployment rate 
at school leaving is positively (negatively) associated with the probability of binge 
drinking (obesity) in middle age.  Consistent with labor studies that document negative 
career effects of leaving school when the state unemployment rate is high, health 
behavior marker effects are concentrated among college educated men.  My preferred 
specification implies that a 1 percentage point increase in the state unemployment rate 
at school leaving is leads to a 2.8 percentage point increase in the probability of binge 
drinking and a 5.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of obesity at middle 
age among college educated men.  This affect is observed 17 to 33 years after leaving 
school when men are 43 to 51 years of age.  Macroeconomic fluctuations at school 
leaving do not affect women’s health behavior markers.  These non-findings are 
consistent with labor studies that document no link between macroeconomic 
fluctuations at school leaving and career outcomes among women.  Results are robust 
to various econometric specifications, including the use of instrumental variables to 
account for the potential endogeneity of the time and location of school leaving.   
My findings are timely because the U.S. is recovering from the 2007-2009 
recession. Figure 2.3 plots the national unemployment rate between 1950 and 2010.  
The high unemployment rates of, and slow recovery from, the 2007-09 recession are 
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apparent.  The national unemployment rate was 8.2% in March 2012; this translates 
into 12.8 million unemployed persons (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS], 2012).  
42.6% of the unemployed can be categorized as in long term unemployment, defined 
as an unemployment spell lasting 27 weeks or more.  The rate of unemployment is 
particularly high among new labor market entrants: 13.8%, among those aged 20-24 
(BLS, 2012).  Rates of underemployment are estimated to be as high as 14.9% (BLS, 
2012).  Underemployment includes workers in part time jobs for economic reasons, 
discouraged workers, and persons marginally attached to the labor market.  Several 
recent economics studies find that the 2007-09 recession led to stress, food insecurity, 
morbidity, poor diet, sedentary lifestyles, lower use of medical services, and loss of 
health insurance (Nord et al, 2010; Dave & Kelly, 2010; Lusardi et al, 2010; Cawley 
et al, 2011; Colman & Dave, 2011; Currie & Telkin, 2011; Deaton, 2011; Holahan, 
2011).   
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FIGURE 2.3. National unemployment rate: 1950-2010 
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Notes: Data are drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics Historical Unemployment 
Rate data series (series number LNS14000000).  The early 1980s recession (July 1981-
November 1982) is indicated with dashed lines and the late 2000s recession (December 
2007- June 2009) is indicated with dotted lines.   
 
Because the early 1980s recession lies in the middle of the quasi-experiment, 
my findings are potentially useful for current policy makers.  Although the U.S. has 
undergone substantial economic and demographic changes in the last 30 years, the 
early 1980s recession is arguably the most comparable economic event for projecting 
the persistent impact of the 2007-09 recession.  Both recessions were long contractions 
(16 and 18 months, the average recession between 1945 and 2000 lasted 11 months 
[NBER, 2011]) and generated high, sustained unemployment.  There are differences 
between these two contractions.  For example, the early 1980s recession was 
concentrated in the manufacturing sector while the 2007-09 recession was experienced 
more broadly and the recovery period from the 2007-09 recession is more sluggish 
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than the early 1980s recession (Farber, 2011).  These differences in the extent of the 
two recessions implies that effects of the 2007-09 recession may be larger than any 
effects identified using variation generated in the early 1980s recession. 
This study contributes to several economic literatures.  First, it adds to the 
literature on the effects of leaving school in a bad economy (Oyer, 2006; Kahn, 2010; 
Maclean, 2012; Oreopoulos et al, 2012; Schoar & Zuo, 2011), as it identifies a 
previously unrecognized consequence: health behavior markers.  Second, this study 
contributes to the active line of research that examines the health effects of 
macroeconomic fluctuations (Ruhm, 2003; Arkes, 2007; Dave & Kelly, 2010; Colman 
& Dave, 2011; Davalos et al, forthcoming).  Previous studies document that 
macroeconomic fluctuations have short run effects on health behavior markers.  This 
line of research is active and decidedly mixed.  My findings imply that 
macroeconomic fluctuations experienced at an important transition (school leaving) 
have a persistent effect on health behavior markers.  My finding that leaving school 
when the state unemployment rate is high leads to an increase in the probability of 
binge drinking is consistent with recent work by Dávalos et al (forthcoming) that finds 
heavy drinking increases with the state unemployment rate but not the work of Ruhm 
(1995; 2002).  Alternatively, my finding that a high state unemployment rate at school 
leaving leads to a decrease in the probability of obesity in middle age agrees with 
work by Ruhm (2003) and Dave & Rashad Kelly (2010).  Understanding the effect of 
macroeconomic conditions on health is an important area for future research.  Third, 
this paper contributes to the growing interest in sensitive developmental periods 
(Heckman, 2007; Almond & Currie, 2011): neuroscience research documents that 
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school leaving age is an important period for emotional development (Dahl, 2004).  
This study highlights the importance of a particular shock: the macroeconomy at 
school leaving.  Fourth, the findings in this study add to our understanding of health 
disparities between cohorts and the persistent health effects of the 2007-09 recession.  
My findings offer new information on the health effects of the macroeconomy and 
cohort level health disparities.  Policy makers may consider timing health programs 
(e.g., access to low cost health promotion programs, income support) to active when 
the unemployment rate increases.   
This study is a work in progress.  I have made several simplifying assumptions 
that I will relax in future versions.  For example, in future work I will explore in more 
depth potential mechanisms for the net effect identified in the preferred specification, 
examine the dynamics of the relationship between the macroeconomic fluctuations at 
school leaving and later health behavior markers, exploit the repeated information on 
health behavior markers rather than focusing solely on the persistent effects, update 
the data set to include the 2010 round of the NLSY79, investigate health behavior 
marker effects in the NLSY97, and examine the continuous smoking, drinking, and 
body weight measures.  These extensions will hopefully provide more conclusive 
evidence on how macroeconomic fluctuations at school leaving affect the health 
behaviors examined in this study.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
UNFIT FOR SERVICE: THE IMPLICATIONS OF RISING OBESITY FOR 
U.S. MILITARY RECRUITMENT SUB-HEADING ONE 
 
John H. Cawley30 and Johanna Catherine Maclean31 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper contributes to the literature on the labor market consequences of unhealthy 
behaviors and poor health by examining a previously underappreciated consequence 
of the rise in obesity in the United States: challenges for military recruitment.  
Specifically, this paper estimates the percent of the U.S. military-age population that 
exceeds the U.S. Army’s current active duty enlistment standards for weight-for-
height and percent body fat, using data from the series of National Health and 
Nutrition Examination Surveys that spans 1959-2008.  We calculate that the 
percentage of military-age adults ineligible for enlistment because they are overweight 
and overfat more than doubled for men and tripled for women during that time.  As of 
2007-08, 5.7 million men and 16.5 million women exceeded the Army’s enlistment 
standards for weight and body fat.  We document disparities across race and education 
in exceeding the standards, and estimate that a further rise of just 1% in weight and 
body fat would further reduce eligibility for military service by over 850,000 men and 
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1.3 million women.  The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of 
these findings for military recruitment and defense policy. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
A substantial literature in economics studies the labor market and public health 
consequences of obesity.  For example, several studies conclude that obesity lowers 
the probability of employment (e.g. Morris, 2007; Rooth, 2009) and lowers wages 
among the employed (e.g. Averett and Korenman, 1996; Cawley, 2004; Kline and 
Tobias, 2008).  Other studies calculate the impact of obesity on U.S. health care costs, 
recent estimates of which are in the range of $147-$168 billion per year (Finkelstein et 
al., 2009; Cawley and Meyerhoefer, 2010).   This paper focuses on a previously 
underappreciated labor market and public policy consequence of the obesity epidemic 
in the United States: substantial reductions in eligibility for military service.   
Between 1959-62 and 2007-08, the age-adjusted prevalence of overweight 
(defined as a body mass index32, or BMI, of 25 or higher) among adult males in the 
U.S. rose from 47.4% to 68.3% (Flegal et al., 1998; Flegal et al., 2002; Flegal et al., 
2010).  Over that same period, the prevalence of obesity (defined as a BMI of 30 or 
higher) among adult males in the U.S. tripled from 10.7% to 32.2% (Ibid).  The 
prevalence of obesity defined using percent body fat (instead of BMI) has also 
increased dramatically in the past five decades (Burkhauser et al., 2009). 
This paper examines the consequences of this rise in obesity for the largest 
employer in the United States: the Department of Defense or DoD (NRC, 2006).  In 
                                                 
32 Body mass index (BMI) is calculated as weight in kilograms divided by height in meters squared. 
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2009 there were over 1.4 million men and women on active duty in the U.S. military, 
with an additional 1.1 million men and women in the military reserves (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2011).  Currently, the DoD must recruit approximately 184,000 new military 
personnel every year to replace those who leave the service because of retirement or 
other reasons (U.S. Bureau Labor Statistics, 2009).   Recruitment has become more 
challenging for the U.S. military since it initiated two major overseas operations: 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (March 20, 2003 – September 1, 2010), which transitioned 
into Operation New Dawn (September 1, 2010 – present), and Operation Enduring 
Freedom – Afghanistan (October 7, 2001 – present). These operations, which 
increased the military’s demand for recruits (in particular, by the Army and Marine 
Corps) have also decreased the supply of applicants because they raise the risk of 
injury and death (Asch et al., 2010; Simon and Warner, 2007).  In order to meet its 
recruiting targets, the U.S. Army was forced to substantially expand the availability 
and size of enlistment bonuses between 2004 and 2008 (Asch et al., 2010).   The 
recession that began in late 2007 facilitated military recruitment by increasing the 
number applying to enlist.   
Physical fitness in general, and body weight and body fat in particular, are 
highly relevant to military occupations (Institute of Medicine (IOM), 1990, 2004; 
Naghii, 2006).  Militaries worldwide have long valued a physically fit appearance as 
an important signal of strength, discipline, and professionalism, and consider it 
important for morale and pride and thus effectiveness (IOM, 2004; Yamane, 2007; 
McLaughlin and Wittert, 2009).  Moreover, military service often requires muscular 
and cardio-respiratory endurance, which can be hampered when body fat is excessive 
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(U.S. DoD, 2004).  Several studies have found that heavier individuals, especially 
women, are more likely to fail basic training than healthy weight individuals (Jones et 
al., 1988; Knapik et al., 2001; Poston et al., 2002).  Among Navy personnel, men and 
women with high weight-for-height are more likely to fail their semi-annual Physical 
Readiness Test (Bohnker et al., 2005).  It is estimated that, among U.S. active duty 
military, overweight and obesity are responsible for 658,000 missed work days 
(absenteeism) and the equivalent of 17,000 missed work days due to lower 
productivity while at work (presenteeism), for a total productivity cost of $105.6 
million per year (Dall et al., 2007).  TRICARE, the U.S. military health insurance 
program, spends $1.1 billion annually treating obesity-related illness (Dall et al., 
2007).  For comparison, that is more than TRICARE spends annually treating illnesses 
related to tobacco use ($564 million) and alcohol consumption ($425 million) 
combined (Dall et al., 2007). The IOM has warned that obesity “threaten[s] the long-
term welfare and readiness of U.S. military forces” (IOM, 2004, p.1) and an 
association of retired generals and admirals has declared that rising youth obesity 
threatens the future strength of the U.S. military and thus U.S. national security 
(Mission: Readiness, 2010).  
Because of the importance of healthy body weight and composition for 
military readiness and effectiveness, the military imposes weight-for-height and 
percent body fat standards for enlistment.  Thus, the high and rising prevalence of 
obesity in the U.S. civilian population makes it more difficult for the U.S. military to 
find acceptable numbers of quality recruits (Yamane, 2007; McLaughlin and Wittert, 
2009).  Excessive weight and body fat is now the most common reason for medical 
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disqualification, leading to rejection of 23.3% of all applicants to the military (NRC, 
2006).  For comparison, the second most common reason is smoking marijuana, which 
leads to rejection of 12.6% of applicants (NRC, 2006).  Roughly 15,000 applicants to 
the military are rejected each year for exceeding the standards for weight and body fat 
(Mission: Readiness, 2010). 
The purpose of this paper is not simply to confirm that rising obesity has 
reduced eligibility for military service.  Instead, our objective is to estimate more 
accurately than ever before the number and percentage of military-age civilians who 
exceed enlistment standards for weight-for-height and percent body fat.  We document 
both current (2007-08) levels and trends over the period of rising obesity: 1959-2008.  
We also examine the personal characteristics (age, race, ethnicity, education, and 
marital status) associated with exceeding those enlistment standards.  Finally, we 
simulate how future changes in weight and percent body fat would further affect 
eligibility for military service.  For the sake of brevity we focus on results for the U.S. 
Army, but results for the Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps are consistent and 
available upon request. 
As of 2011, military service is less common than it was when the U.S. was 
engaged in large-scale wars.33  Although in historical terms the U.S. military is 
currently small (as a percent of the U.S. population), that is misleading as to the 
potential threat that obesity-related disqualifications represent to future national 
security.  Militaries must be able to expand greatly and rapidly to meet emerging 
national security threats.  That is evident in Figure 3.1, which graphs the size of the 
                                                 
33 For example, Figure 1 in Card and Lemieux (2001) illustrates the decline in the U.S. male veteran 
rate that began with birth cohorts in the early 1930s. 
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active-duty U.S. military as a percentage of the U.S. population.34  This figure shows 
that the U.S. has commonly had to rapidly and dramatically increase the size of its 
military, most notably for World War II (1941-45) and the Civil War (1861-65), but 
large percentage increases in the size of the military occurred for every U.S. war, 
including the War of 1812, the Mexican-American War, World War I, the Korean 
conflict, and the Vietnam War.  For example, the number of active-duty U.S. military 
personnel rose over 8,400% at the beginning of the Civil War (between 1859 and 
1861), rose over 1,515% at the beginning of World War I (between 1916 and 1918), 
rose over 740% at the beginning of World War II (between 1940 and 1942), and more 
than doubled at the beginning of the Korean conflict (between 1950 and 1951).  The 
U.S. has routinely found it necessary to multiply the size of its armed forces in times 
of crisis.  As a result, one should not be misled by the size of the current military into 
underestimating the possible future implications for national security of large numbers 
of military-age civilians being ineligible for military service.  Confirming evidence of 
this comes from an organization of retired senior military leaders, who have described 
youth obesity as “an epidemic that threatens national security” and are calling for 
public health policies to reduce youth obesity (Mission: Readiness, 2010, p. 2). 
                                                 
34 The data in Figure 1 are taken from Historical Statistics of the United States (Carter, 2006), series 
Ed26 (military personnel on active duty) and Aa7 (resident population of the U.S.) for years 1795-1995, 
and from the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, various years) for years 
1995-present.  For the Civil War (1861-65), only Union forces are included while the population is for 
the combined Union and Confederacy. 
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FIGURE 3.1. Percent of U.S. Population in Active Duty Military: 1801-2009 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
18
00
18
10
18
20
18
30
18
40
18
50
18
60
18
70
18
80
18
90
19
00
19
10
19
20
19
30
19
40
19
50
19
60
19
70
19
80
19
90
20
00
20
10
 
Notes: Data: Historical Statistics of the United States (Carter, 2006), series Ed26 (military 
personnel on active duty) and Aa7 (resident population of the US) for years 1795-1995, and from 
the Statistical Abstract of the United States (U.S. Census Bureau, various years) for years 1995-
present.  For the Civil War (1861-65), only Union forces are included. 
 
This paper relates to several previous studies.  The first is the aforementioned 
report by retired generals and admirals, titled “Too Fat to Fight” (Mission: Readiness, 
2010).  That report lists the percentage of 18-24 year old Americans who were 
overweight or obese in 2006-2008, but did not examine the other ages eligible to enlist 
in the Army (25-42), and did not calculate what fraction met military enlistment 
standards for both weight-for-height and percent body fat.  Moreover, the estimates of 
the prevalence of overweight and obese were based on self-reported weight and 
height, which tend to be substantially underreported (e.g. Rowland, 1974; Cawley and 
Burkhauser, 2006), potentially resulting in severe misclassification error (Nieto-Garcia 
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et al., 1990).  Other studies have used a subset of the data examined in this paper to 
calculate the percent of Americans meeting military weight-for-height standards in a 
narrow span of years; e.g. Nolte et al. (2002) examines 1988-94 and Yamane (2007) 
examines 2001-04.  Those papers did not examine whether subjects also met the 
military standards for percent body fat.   
This paper offers six improvements over the previous literature.  First, we 
examine levels and trends over a much longer period: 1959-2008.  Second, we 
examine not only whether civilians exceed the military enlistment standards for 
weight-for-height but also those for percent body fat.  Third, weight and height are 
measured by medical professionals rather than self-reported.  Fourth, we investigate 
which personal characteristics predict exceeding the standards.  Fifth, we examine four 
sets of historic weight-for-height standards of the U.S. Army to determine how 
eligibility would differ if historic standards had remained in place.  Sixth, we simulate 
how future changes in weight and body fat would affect future eligibility for 
enlistment. 
This paper relates to several economic literatures.  First, it contributes to the 
literature on the economics of obesity, as it documents a previously underappreciated 
labor market consequence of rising obesity.  Second, the paper relates to the larger 
literature on the labor market consequences of risky health behaviors (e.g. Mullahy 
and Sindelar, 1993, 1996; vanOurs, 2004; Auld, 2005), some of which is published in 
this journal (e.g. McDonald and Shields, 2004; Johansson et al., 2007; Renna, 2007; 
Norton and Han, 2008).  Third, the paper relates to the literature on defense 
economics.  Defense economists have noted that there has been relatively little 
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research on the economics of military manpower and human resource issues in the 
military (Sandler and Hartley, 1995).35   This paper makes an important and timely 
contribution to defense economics, as “There is scant literature covering civilian 
obesity levels and military recruitment” (Yamane, 2007, p. 1160). 
 
II. Military Standards for Weight-for-Height and Percent Body Fat 
General physical standards for enlistment in the American military can be 
traced back to 1775, when Congress called for “able bodied” men to be formed into 
militia (Johnson, 1997).  Weight-for-height standards for enlistment were first issued 
in 1887 for men and in the 1940s for women; initially their primary function was to 
exclude individuals who were underweight (Johnson, 1997), but in recent decades far 
more applicants are excluded for being overweight (NRC, 2006).36  Exact standards 
for weight have evolved continuously since they were first implemented (Johnson, 
1997).   
Today, the DoD mandates that each military service enforce standards for 
recruiting that include maximum weight-for-height and percent body fat (U.S. DoD, 
2004).37  Historically, the military assessed only weight-for-height, not percent body 
fat.  Weight-for-height has the advantage of being quick and easy to measure, but as a 
measure of fatness it is flawed because it ignores body composition.  As a result, a 
maximum weight-for-height may not only exclude those who are fat, but also those 
                                                 
35 Reviews of the research on the economics of military manpower are provided by Sandler and Hartley 
(1995), Warner and Asch (1995), and Asch et al. (2007).   
36 Economic historians have extensively studied the historic data on weight and height of conscripts and 
recruits, for example using them to track long-term trends in standards of living and health; see e.g. 
Komlos (1987, 2008) and Costa (1993, 2004). 
37 All military services also have a set of weight standards for those already in the service that are as 
strict as, or stricter than, those applied to new recruits (IOM, 2004). 
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who are muscular and thus particularly desirable recruits (see, e.g. Burkhauser and 
Cawley, 2008).  This became more of a limitation in recent decades, as American men 
became more muscular.  One way of measuring muscularity is to calculate the 
percentage of Americans who are obese by the standard of BMI (BMI>=30) but not 
obese by the standard of percent body fat (PBF>25% for men, PBF>30% for women).  
The trend in this proxy for muscularity is depicted in Figure 3.2, using data from the 
National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys (which are explained in more 
detail in the Data section below).  Figure 3.2 shows that muscularity rose dramatically 
for men; the percentage of men who are obese by BMI but not by PBF nearly tripled 
between 1960 and 2008 (rising from 4.0 to 11.2 percent).  In contrast, muscularity 
among women remained relatively constant (between 0 and 2 percent) between 1960 
and 2008. 
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FIGURE 3.2. Proxy for Muscularity: Percent Obese by BMI but not by Percent Body Fat 
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Notes: Data: NHES (1959-62), NHANES I (1971-75), NHANES II (1976-80), NHANES III (1988-94), 
and NHANES Continuous (1999-2000, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2005-06, and 2007-08).  For NHES I and 
NHANES I, II, and III, points are located at the median year of the survey.  For NHANES Continuous, 
points are placed at the first of the two years of the survey.  Obesity definitions are: BMI>=30, percent 
body fat greater than 25% for men, greater than 30% for women. 
 
Although the DoD provides general guidance, each service can determine its 
own minimum and maximum weight-for-height and percent body fat standards for 
enlistment (NRC, 2006; Yamane, 2007).  The U.S. Army’s current weight-for-height 
and percent body fat standards for active duty enlistment are listed in Table 3.1 for 
men and Table 3.2 for women.  The weight-for-height standards of the Army vary 
with age (permitting older recruits to be heavier).  Likewise, the maximum allowable 
percent body fat increases with age, from 26% to 30% for men and 32% to 36% for 
women.  
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 TABLE 3.1. Current U.S. Army active duty enlistment standards for body weight and percent 
body fat, men 
 Minimum 
weight(lbs) 
Maximum weight(lbs) 
by age 
Height (inches) All 17-20 21-27 28-39 40+ 
60 97 139 141 143 146 
61 100 144 146 148 151 
62 104 148 150 153 156 
63 107 153 155 158 161 
64 110 158 160 163 166 
65 114 163 165 168 171 
66 117 168 170 173 177 
67 121 174 176 179 182 
68 125 179 181 184 187 
69 128 184 186 189 193 
70 132 189 192 195 199 
71 136 194 197 201 204 
72 140 200 203 206 210 
73 144 205 208 212 216 
74 148 211 214 218 222 
75 152 217 220 224 228 
76 156 223 226 230 234 
77 160 229 232 236 240 
78 164 235 238 242 247 
79 168 241 244 248 253 
80 173 247 250 255 259 
Maximum percent body fat -- 26 26 28 30 
Notes: Source is Army Regulation 40-501 Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 (December, 2007).  Eligible age 
range is 17-42 years.  
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TABLE 3.2. Current U.S. Army active duty enlistment standards for body weight and percent 
body fat, women 
 Minimum 
weight(lbs)
Maximum weight(lbs) 
by age 
Height (inches) All 17-20 21-27 28-39 40+ 
58 91 122 124 126 127 
59 94 127 128 130 131 
60 97 132 134 135 136 
61 100 136 137 139 141 
62 104 140 141 144 145 
63 107 145 147 148 149 
64 110 149 151 153 154 
65 114 154 156 158 160 
66 117 160 160 162 165 
67 121 163 166 168 169 
68 125 168 171 173 174 
69 128 173 176 178 180 
70 132 178 181 183 185 
71 136 183 186 188 191 
72 140 189 191 194 196 
73 144 194 196 200 202 
74 148 199 203 204 206 
75 152 205 208 210 212 
76 156 210 213 215 216 
77 160 216 219 221 223 
78 164 222 224 227 229 
79 168 227 230 234 236 
80 173 233 236 240 241 
Maximum percent body fat -- 32 32 34 36 
Notes: Source is Army Regulation 40-501 Table 2-1 and Table 2-2 (December,2007).  Eligible age 
range is 17-42 years.   
 
The standards in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 apply to the Army.  The Navy, Air Force, 
and Marines have their own weight-for-height and body fat requirements.  Despite the 
substantial differences in standards across services, the National Research Council 
notes that “There is no rationale given for this variability” (NRC, 2006, p. 117). 
Applicants to the military receive medical examinations at military entrance 
processing stations (MEPS).  A two-stage process is used to screen weight and body 
composition (NRC, 2006).  The first stage is to measure weight and height; if the 
applicant is in the range of acceptable weight-for-height, then no further screening is 
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required.  If the applicant exceeds the maximum weight-for-height, then percent body 
fat is assessed using height and the circumferences of some combination of the 
abdomen, waist, hip, and neck.  The measurement sites vary by service; the Army uses 
the abdomen and neck (U.S. Army, 2006).  If the applicant’s percent body fat is in the 
acceptable range, then the applicant is classified as meeting the requirements.  
Applicants who exceed both the weight-for-height and percent body fat thresholds are 
disqualified from enlisting and are encouraged to lose weight and then return to the 
MEPS for another assessment; under current regulations they must wait four days for 
every pound of weight to be lost (NRC, 2006).  Disqualified applicants have the 
option of applying for a waiver; each service has its own policy on granting such 
waivers; see NRC (2006). 
 
III. Data 
This study utilizes the full series of nationally representative, cross-sectional 
health surveys sponsored by the National Center for Health Statistics of the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention.  The National Health Examination Survey, Cycle 
I (NHES) was conducted during 1959-1962.  The National Health and Nutrition 
Examination Surveys (NHANES) program began with NHANES I, which was 
conducted 1971-1975, and was followed by NHANES II (1976-1980), NHANES III 
(1988-1994), and NHANES Continuous (1999-2000, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2005-06, and 
2007-08).  For information on the sampling frame and methods of data collection in 
these surveys, see National Center for Health Statistics (1965; 1977; 1994; 2000) and 
McDowell et al. (1981).  In each of these surveys, a nationally representative sample 
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of the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population was selected using a complex, 
stratified, multistage probability cluster sampling design.  These are the best available 
data for estimating trends in the number and percent of U.S. military-age civilians who 
exceed the weight-for-height and percent body fat standards of the military, as the data 
are nationally representative, frequently collected over the past five decades, include 
demographic information such as age and gender, and, most importantly, contain 
measurements of weight, height, and other anthropometrics that can be used to 
calculate percent body fat. 
Each NHES and NHANES survey included physical examinations conducted 
in a specially-designed and equipped mobile examination center where a scientific 
team including a physician and medical and health technicians measured weight, 
height, and skinfold thickness at the tricep and subscapular region (which is below the 
shoulder blade).  Additional measures of fatness were recorded in certain surveys, but 
the only fatness measures that were collected consistently from NHES until NHANES 
2007-08 are weight, height, and the two measures of skinfold thickness.   
The maximum weight that could be measured was not binding in NHES, and 
was 400 pounds (182 kg) in NHANES I and II.  In NHANES III it was again not 
binding and in NHANES Continuous it was 440 kg (968 pounds).  The top-coding of 
weight does not affect our classification of individuals, as everyone with the maximum 
weight -- regardless of height -- is not weight eligible for enlistment in the military.38 
                                                 
38 The tallest height listed in any of the military standards is 86 inches and the maximum allowable 
weight for that height is 263 pounds, which is well below the top-coding of weight in the NHES or 
NHANES. 
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Skinfold thickness at the tricep and subscapular region were assessed using 
calipers.  The NHES and NHANES medical technicians were trained in measuring 
skinfold thickness to ensure accuracy and reliability (National Center for Health 
Statistics, 2000). The NHANES III and NHANES Continuous noted when a skinfold 
exceeded the capacity of the calipers.  We recode the skinfold thickness of such 
individuals to the maximum caliper size, but this top-coding does not affect estimates 
of eligibility for enlistment in the military because such individuals are not  eligible 
whether their skinfold is set equal to the maximum caliper size or an even larger 
number.39  In addition to recording whether the skinfold exceeded the maximum 
caliper size, the NHANES III and NHANES Continuous indicated if the examiner 
could not obtain a measurement (presumably for reasons other than the skinfold 
exceeding the maximum caliper size).  When the skinfold could not be obtained, we 
impute it separately by sex using the other skinfold thickness (either tricep or 
subscapular), measured height and weight, age, age squared, race, and ethnicity; this 
prediction equation is based on respondents with complete information.40  These 
regression models explain between 54.87% and 79.13% of the variance in skinfolds, 
                                                 
39 The percentage of our analysis sample with tricep skinfolds larger than the maximum caliper size is 
as follows: 1.20% in NHANES III and from 2.44% to 5.16% in each of the five surveys in NHANES 
Continuous.  The percentage of our analysis sample with subscapular skinfolds larger than the 
maximum caliper size is as follows: 1.48% in NHANES III, 3.67% in NHANES 1999-2000, 1.22% in 
NHANES 2001-02, 1.60% in NHANES 2003-04, 1.62% in NHANES 2005-06, and 1.87% in NHANES 
2007-08. 
40 The percentage of our analysis sample for whom tricep skinfold thickness could not be obtained was 
1.81% in NHANES III, 5.53% in NHANES 1999-2000, 4.61% in NHANES 2001-02, 6.55% in 
NHANES 2003-04, 4.15% in NHANES 2005-06, and 3.32% in NHANES 2007-08.  The percentage of 
our analysis sample for which subscapular skinfold thickness could not be obtained was 3.63% in 
NHANES III, 13.80% in NHANES 1999-2000, 13.80% in NHANES 2001-02, 13.25% in NHANES 
2003-04, 14.54% in NHANES 2005-06, and 12.89% in NHANES 2007-08. 
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implying that the imputation procedure provides reasonable predictions for missing 
skinfolds. 
Skinfold thicknesses at the tricep and subscapular region are used to calculate 
body density using the equations in Durnin and Womersley (1974).  Body density is 
then used to calculate percent body fat (Siri, 1956; Durnin and Womersley, 1974).   
We exclude women who were pregnant at the time of the interview (for each 
survey), and when the information is available (i.e. NHANES I, II, and III) women 
who were pregnant in the previous year.  We examine only those civilians who are 
age-eligible to enlist in the Army; i.e. those aged 17-42 years.  After excluding 
respondents that did not provide valid responses to all survey items of interest the final 
combined sample size is 35,337.41    
 
IV. Methods 
In order to estimate the number and percent of military-age Americans who 
exceed the U.S Army’s enlistment standards for weight-for-height and percent body 
fat, we use the military’s two-stage process.  First, we compare the subject’s measured 
weight and height to the active duty enlistment standards of the Army.  If the subject’s 
weight is between the minimum and maximum allowable for their height, the subject 
is classified as meeting the standard.  If the subject’s weight exceeds the maximum 
weight for their height, then the subject’s percent body fat is compared to the 
maximum threshold.  If the subject’s percent body fat is less than or equal to the 
                                                 
41 Final analysis sample sizes for each survey are: 3,414 for NHES; 6,545 for NHANES I; 5,464 for 
NHANES II;  7576 for NHANES III; 2,393 for NHANES 1999-2000; 2,628 for NHANES 2001-02; 
2,446 for NHANES 2003-04; 2,484 for NHANES 2005-06; and 2,387 for NHANES 2007-08. 
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maximum allowable, then she is classified as meeting the standard.  Subjects who 
exceed both the weight-for-height and percent body fat thresholds are coded as 
exceeding the standards.   
Population sample weights for those who underwent medical examinations are 
used when estimating the number and percent of military-age respondents who exceed 
the U.S. Army’s standards.  We test the hypothesis of equality across surveys (and, 
therefore, across time) in the percentage of military-age civilians who exceed Army 
standards for weight-for-height and body fat. 
We also examine which personal characteristics predict exceeding the current 
Army active duty enlistment standards for weight and body fat.  Specifically, we 
estimate probit regressions in which the dependent variable is an indicator for 
exceeding the Army weight and body fat standards, using the most recent data, the 
NHANES Continuous (1999-2008).  Regressors include: age (20-24; 25-29; 30-34; 
35-39; and 40-42 with 17-19 as the omitted category), race/ethnicity42 (African 
American, Hispanic, and other, with White as the omitted category), education (less 
than high school, some college, and college graduate, with high school graduate as the 
omitted category), marital status (divorced/widowed/separated and never married, 
with married as the omitted category), and survey fixed effects (NHANES 1999-2000 
as the omitted category).  We estimate the reduced-form body fatness production 
function in equation (1): 
(1)     ' '0 1 2Pr( 1) ( )it it tE X D        
                                                 
42 NHES and NHANES I, II, and III race and ethnicity information is provided in four mutually 
exclusive categories: white, black, Hispanic, and other.  For consistency we use these categories in all 
survey years.  At the urging of referees, we exclude income from the set of regressors. 
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Where itE  is an indicator variable for individual i in survey t exceeding current active 
duty Army enlistment standards for weight-for-height and body fat, itX  is a vector of 
characteristics for individual i in survey t, tD  is a vector of survey fixed effects, and 
the α’s are the parameters to be estimated.  In all regressions, we use the sampling 
weights for those who underwent medical examinations.  As recommended by the 
NHES and NHANES, standard errors are clustered around the primary sampling unit.  
For ease of interpretation, we calculate the marginal effect for each individual and 
report the average of those marginal effects.43  We also report the probit coefficients 
and their standard errors.  We estimate two specifications of the probit model: 1) one 
that controls for only exogenous variables (age, race, ethnicity); and 2) one that 
controls for a richer set of regressors (age, race, ethnicity, education, and marital 
status).  Statistical analyses are conducted using Stata for Windows software version 
11 (StataCorp, 2009).   
 
V. Results 
The percent of age-eligible U.S. civilians who exceed the U.S. Army’s active 
duty enlistment standards for weight and body fat are listed in Table 3.3.   Each row 
corresponds to a specific survey: NHES (conducted 1959-62), NHANES I (1971-75), 
NHANES II (1976-80), NHANES III (1988-94), and the various NHANES 
Continuous surveys (1999-2000, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2005-06, and 2007-08).   
                                                 
43 We also calculated marginal effects for a hypothetical person with the average values of the 
regressors and found very similar results. 
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TABLE 3.3. Percent of age-eligible civilians who exceed current Army active duty enlistment 
standards for weight and percent body fat, by survey and gender 
 (1) (2) 
Survey and Survey Years Men Women 
NHES I:  1959-1962 5.548 
(0.918) 
[N=1637] 
11.464 
(0.919) 
[N=1777] 
NHANES I: 1971-1975 4.376 
(0.587) 
[N=2280] 
15.909 
(0.636) 
[N=4265] 
NHANES II: 1976-1980 6.155 
(0.495) 
[N=2828] 
18.589 
(0.892) 
[N=2636] 
NHANES III: 1988-1994 7.270 
(0.741) 
[N=3871] 
27.129 
(1.398) 
[N=3705] 
NHANES 1999-2000 11.703 
(1.359) 
[N=1230] 
31.511 
(2.294) 
[N=1163] 
NHANES 2001-2002 10.716 
(0.642) 
[N=1380] 
28.524 
(1.921) 
[N=1248] 
NHANES 2003-2004 10.395 
(1.214) 
[N=1295] 
32.957 
(2.510) 
[N=1151] 
NHANES 2005-2006 10.847 
(1.364) 
[N=1305] 
28.832 
(1.874) 
[N=1179] 
NHANES 2007-2008 11.701 
(1.311) 
[N=1219] 
34.645 
(2.107) 
[N=1168] 
Percentage Point Change Between 
NHES I and NHANES 07-08 
6.153 23.181 
Percent Change Between NHES I and 
NHANES 07-08 
110.901 202.213 
p-value1 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes:  Percent exceeding standards is calculated by applying current Army weight standards to 
historical data.  See Tables 1 and 2 for current Army enlistment weight standards.  Sampling weights 
with adjustment for strata are used. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and unweighted sample 
sizes are reported in square brackets. 
1t-test for difference in means between NHES I and NHANES 2007-2008. 
For both men and women, the percent of military-age civilians who exceed the 
Army’s weight and body fat requirements rose significantly between the earliest 
(1959-62) and the most recent (2007-08) surveys.   Column 1 of Table 3.3 shows that 
the percentage of age-eligible (i.e. 17-42 years) male civilians who exceed the Army’s 
weight and body fat limits rose from 5.55% in 1959-62 to 11.70% in 2007-08.  This 
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rise of 6.15 percentage points, or 110.90%, is statistically significant at less than a 1% 
level.   
The percentage of the population that exceeds the Army enlistment standards 
for weight-for-height and percent body fat has risen more for women than men.  
Column 2 of Table 3.3 shows that the percentage of age-eligible (i.e. 17-42 years) 
female civilians who exceed the Army’s weight-for-height and percent body fat 
requirements rose from 11.46% in 1959-62 to 34.65% in 2007-08.  This rise of 23.18 
percentage points, or 202.21%, is statistically significant at less than a 1% level.  
Figure 3.3 plots the increase over time in the percent of military-age civilian men and 
women who exceed the Army’s enlistment requirements for weight-for-height and 
percent body fat.44   
                                                 
44 In all Figures, data points are placed at the median year of the survey for NHES I and NHANES I, II, 
and III, and at the first of the two years of the survey for NHANES Continuous. 
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FIGURE 3.3. Percent of age-eligible civilians exceeding current Army active duty 
enlistment standards for weight and body fat 
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Notes: Data: NHES (1959-62), NHANES I (1971-75), NHANES II (1976-80), NHANES III 
(1988-94), and NHANES Continuous (1999-2000, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2005-06, and 2007-08).  
See Table 3 for survey-specific estimates. For NHES I and NHANES I, II, and III, points are 
located at the median year of the survey.  For NHANES Continuous, points are placed at the 
first of the two years of the survey. 
 
We also calculate the total number of military-age men and women who would 
be disqualified from enlisting in the Army for exceeding current weight and fat 
enlistment standards; results are listed in Table 3.4.  In the most recent data (2007-08), 
5.7 million age-eligible civilian men and 16.5 million age-eligible civilian women 
exceed both the weight-for-height and percent body fat enlistment standards of the 
Army.   
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TABLE 3.4. Total number of age-eligible civilians who exceed current Army active duty 
enlistment standards for weight and percent body fat, by survey and gender 
 (1) (2) 
 Men Women 
NHES I:  1959-1962 1,463,445 3,159,992 
NHANES I: 1971-1975 1,541,200 5,266,731 
NHANES II: 1976-1980 2,490,037 6,869,053 
NHANES III: 1988-1994 3,555,372 11,396,794 
NHANES 1999-2000 6,088,302 15,182,625 
NHANES 2001-2002 5,289,890 13,281,802 
NHANES 2003-2004 5,132,264 15,485,703 
NHANES 2005-2006 5,263,425 12,992,811 
NHANES 2007-2008 5,743,082 16,464,419 
Notes:  Total number of Americans exceeding standards for enlistment is calculated by applying 
current Army weight standards to historical data.  See Tables 1 and 2 for current Army enlistment 
weight standards.   
 
We also investigate the correlates of exceeding current active duty enlistment 
standards for weight and body fat.  Table 3.5 reports the results of probit regressions 
of exceeding the enlistment standards, estimated using data from the NHANES 
Continuous (1999-2008) for those who are age-eligible to enlist in the Army.45  Each 
cell of the table lists the probit coefficient, the standard error (clustered by primary 
sampling unit) in parentheses, and the average marginal effect in square brackets.  
                                                 
45 Observations with missing information on race, ethnicity, education, and marital status are dropped 
from the analysis sample; this sample is slightly smaller than the sample used in the estimation of 
percent and number eligible for military service. 
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TABLE 3.5. Correlates of exceeding current Army active duty enlistment standards for weight 
and body fat, Continuous NHANES (1999-2008) 
 Men Women 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) 
20-24 years 0.081 0.008 0.356*** 0.403*** 
 (0.095) 
[0.015] 
(0.091) 
[0.001] 
(0.086) 
[0.122] 
(0.091) 
[0.136] 
25-29 years 0.095 0.001 0.539*** 0.683*** 
 (0.107) 
[0.018] 
(0.116) 
[0.000] 
(0.078) 
[0.185] 
(0.094) 
[0.231] 
30-34 years 0.097 -0.001 0.531*** 0.669*** 
 (0.102) 
[0.018] 
(0.114) 
[0.000] 
(0.065) 
[0.182] 
(0.087) 
[0.227] 
35-39 years 0.197** 0.095 0.583*** 0.703*** 
 (0.078) 
[0.038] 
(0.100) 
[0.018] 
(0.074) 
[0.200] 
(0.093) 
[0.238] 
40-42 years 0.304*** 0.197* 0.631*** 0.767*** 
 (0.098) 
[0.058] 
(0.117) 
[0.038] 
(0.061) 
[0.217] 
(0.087) 
[0.260] 
African American 0.154** 0.156** 0.563*** 0.514*** 
 (0.067) 
[0.029] 
(0.067) 
[0.030] 
(0.056) 
[0.193] 
(0.057) 
[0.174] 
Hispanic -0.058 -0.061 0.187*** 0.119* 
 (0.071) 
[-0.011] 
(0.074) 
[-0.012] 
(0.059) 
[0.064] 
(0.063) 
[0.040] 
Other race -0.001 0.028 -0.180* -0.147 
 (0.124) 
[0.000] 
(0.123) 
[0.005] 
(0.091) 
[-0.062] 
(0.089) 
[-0.050] 
Less than high school -- -0.077 -- -0.013 
  (0.074) 
[-0.015] 
 (0.067) 
[-0.004] 
Some college -- 0.059 -- -0.016 
  (0.068) 
[0.011] 
 (0.060) 
[-0.005] 
College graduate -- -0.190* -- -0.483*** 
  (0.098) 
[-0.036] 
 (0.065) 
[-0.164] 
Divorced -- -0.100 -- -0.042 
  (0.131) 
[-0.019] 
 (0.077) 
[-0.014] 
Never married -- -0.139* -- 0.006 
  (0.072) 
[-0.026] 
 (0.063) 
[0.002] 
Un-weighted N 5792 5792 5376 5376 
Notes:  See Tables 1 and 2 for current Army enlistment weight standards. All models employ 
sampling weights with adjustment for strata and are estimated with a probit model.  Each cell of 
the table lists the probit coefficient, the standard errors (clustered by primary sampling unit) in 
parentheses, and the average marginal effect in square brackets.  All regressions also include 
survey fixed effects and an intercept.  Reference categories are age 17-19 years, white, high 
school education, and married.  Observations with missing information and pregnant women 
excluded from the analysis sample. 
***;**;*=statistically different from zero at 1%; 5%;10% confidence level. 
 120 
For each gender, Table 3.5 first presents the results of a parsimonious model 
(Model (1)) that includes only the exogenous regressors age and race/ethnicity.  These 
results indicate that African-Americans are more likely to exceed the weight and fat 
standards of the Army. Specifically, African-American males are 2.9 percentage 
points more likely than white males to exceed the standards, and African American 
females are 19.3 percentage points more likely than white females to exceed the 
standards.  In addition, Hispanic females are 6.4 percentage points more likely than 
white females to exceed the standards (the difference for Hispanic men is not 
statistically significant and of the opposite sign).   
Older applicants are allowed higher maximum weights for a given height, as 
well as a higher maximum percent body fat (see Table 3.1 for men and Table 3.2 for 
women).  Still, Table 3.5 indicates that men aged 35-39 and 40-42 are more likely to 
exceed the enlistment standards for weight and body fat.  The same is true for women, 
among whom the association of age with probability of exceeding the standards is 
almost monotonic: the point estimates rise consistently with age.   
Table 3.5 also presents, for each gender, the results of a model that adds 
education and marital status to the set of regressors (Model (2)).  The addition of these 
regressors reduces the marginal effects of age for men, but increases the marginal 
effects of age for women.  African-Americans remain significantly and substantially 
more likely than whites to exceed the standards: 3.0 percentage points more likely for 
men and 17.4 percentage points more likely for women.   
The college-educated are significantly less likely to exceed the standards (3.6 
percentage points less likely for men, and 16.4 percentage points less likely for 
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women).  In addition, never-married men are 2.6 percentage points less likely to 
exceed the enlistment standards for weight and body fat. 
 
VI. Extension: Historic Army Standards  
As an extension, we examine several historic sets of weight standards for the 
Army.  We have located four historic sets of Army active duty enlistment standards 
for weight and body fat: those issued in 1961, 1968, 1976, and 1991 as well as the 
current standards issued in 2007 that are used earlier in this paper.  The 1991 
regulations were the first of which (we are aware) to include a percent body fat 
maximum; earlier regulations relied solely on weight-for-height.  Figures 3.4 (men) 
and 3.5 (women) compare the percent of military-age civilians who exceed Army 
standards for weight and (if applicable) body fat.  These figures reveal that weight-for-
height standards became much more lenient in 1991.  Figure 3.4 shows that, in 2007-
08, roughly 12% of military-age American males exceed the 2007 (current) and 1991 
Army standards, but that percentage would be roughly 20% if the 1961, 1968, or 1976 
weight-for-height standards had remained in place.  Likewise, Figure 3.5 shows that, 
in 2007-08, roughly 35% of military-age American females exceed the 2007 (current) 
and 1991 Army standards, but that percentage would be over 50% if the 1968 or 1976 
standards had remained in place.  In brief, the increase over time in ineligibility would 
have been even greater had the military not relaxed its standards in 1991.46 
                                                 
46 Interestingly, the 1991 regulations are both more lenient, in the sense that they allow an applicant to 
exceed the maximum weight-for-height as long as he is below the maximum percent body fat, and 
stricter, in that the maximum weight in pounds for each height was reduced.  On net, however, they are 
more lenient: a substantially higher percentage of Americans satisfy the 1991 regulations than the 
preceding 1976 regulations.  The 1991 regulations are also arguably more accurate or appropriate than 
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FIGURE 3.4. Percent of age-eligible male civilians exceeding historic Army active duty enlistment 
standards for weight and body fat 
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Notes: Data: NHES (1959-62), NHANES I (1971-75), NHANES II (1976-80), NHANES III (1988-94), 
and NHANES Continuous (1999-2000, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2005-06, and 2007-08).  For NHES I and 
NHANES I, II, and III, points are located at the median year of the survey.  For NHANES Continuous, 
points are placed at the first of the two years of the survey. Current Army-age for enlistment is 17-42 
years. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
preceding regulations, in that the 1991 regulations permit more muscular individuals and reject fatter 
individuals at each height. 
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FIGURE 3.5. Percent of age-eligible female civilians exceeding historic Army active duty 
enlistment standards for weight and body fat 
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Notes: Data: NHES (1959-62), NHANES I (1971-75), NHANES II (1976-80), NHANES III (1988-94), 
and NHANES Continuous (1999-2000, 2001-02, 2003-04, 2005-06, and 2007-08).  For NHES I and 
NHANES I, II, and III, points are located at the median year of the survey.  For NHANES Continuous, 
points are placed at the first of the two years of the survey. Current Army-age for enlistment is 17-42 
years. 
 
VII. Extension: Simulation of Future Changes in Weight and Body Fat 
As an additional extension, we estimate how future changes in weight and 
body fat would affect eligibility for military service.  This is useful for understanding 
how a continuation of the rise in obesity would impact the military in the future.  More 
optimistically, it is also useful for estimating the benefit of a reversal of the obesity 
epidemic (e.g. due to effective public health policies). 
In Tables 3.6 (males) and 3.7 (females), we estimate the impact of changes in 
weight and body fat of 1%, 2%, and 3%, on the number and percent of Americans who 
would exceed Army standards for weight and body fat.  The impact of gains and 
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losses will not necessarily be symmetric, as the additional people pushed over the 
maximum by a given gain is not necessarily equal to the additional people pushed 
under the maximum by a given loss (i.e. the mass around the maximum may not be 
symmetric).  To estimate these effects, we examine respondents to the Continuous 
NHANES (1999-2008), and add or subtract a given percentage (1%, 2%, or 3%) to 
their weight and percent body fat, then recalculate the number and percentage that 
would exceed the Army’s eligibility standards. 
TABLE 3.6. Simulated changes in the number and percent of civilian men exceeding current 
Army enlistment standards for weight and body fat, men 
Change N exceeding % exceeding N change % change 
Lose 3% weight & PBF 3,240,535 6.524 -2,262,858 -41.118 
Lose 2% weight & PBF 4,038,583 8.130 -1,464,809 -26.616 
Lose 1% weight & PBF 4,781,310 9.626 -722,082 -13.121 
No change 5,503,392 11.079 -- -- 
Gain 1% weight & PBF 6,356,113 12.796 852,721 15.494 
Gain 2% weight & PBF 7,109,111 14.312 1,605,718 29.177 
Gain 3% weight & PBF 7,978,377 16.062 2,474,985 44.972 
Notes:  Data: Continuous NHANES (1999-2008).  See TABLE 3.1 for current Army enlistment weight 
standards for men 
 
TABLE 3.7. Simulated changes in the number and percent of civilian women exceeding current 
Army enlistment standards for weight and body fat, women 
Change N exceeding % exceeding N change % change 
Lose 3% weight & PBF 12,065,615 25.746 -2,615,857 -17.817 
Lose 2% weight & PBF 12,932,169 27.595 -1,749,303 -11.915 
Lose 1% weight & PBF 13,791,576 29.429 -889,896 -6.061 
No change 14,681,472 31.328 -- -- 
Gain 1% weight & PBF 15,962,709 34.062 1,281,237 8.727 
Gain 2% weight & PBF 16,902,355 36.067 2,220,883 15.127 
Gain 3% weight & PBF 17,944,518 38.290 3,263,046 22.226 
Notes:  Data: Continuous NHANES (1999-2008).  See TABLE 3.2 for current Army enlistment weight 
standards for women.   
 
 Table 3.6 presents results for men.  A gain of 1%, 2%, or 3% to both weight 
and body fat would raise the number of military-age men who exceed the Army’s 
standards by 0.9 million, 1.6 million, or 2.5 million.  Losses of 1%, 2%, and 3% in 
both weight and body fat would have less of an impact than the equivalent gain; such 
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losses would reduce the number who fail the standards by 0.7 million, 1.5 million, and 
2.3 million.   
 For women (Table 3.7), the asymmetry of impacts between gains and losses is 
even greater.  A gain of 1%, 2%, or 3% to both weight and body fat would raise the 
number of military-age women who exceed the Army’s standards by 1.3 million, 2.2 
million, or 3.3 million.  Losses of 1%, 2%, and 3% have far less of an impact than the 
equivalent gain.  Losses of 1%, 2%, and 3% of weight and body fat would decrease 
the number who exceed the standards by 0.9 million, 1.7 million, and 2.6 million.   
 In summary, even small additional increases in weight and fat have the 
potential to greatly increase the number of military-age civilians who exceed the 
military’s weight-for-height and body fat standards.  Unfortunately, equivalent 
reductions in weight and body fat have smaller beneficial impacts, because (as one 
would expect with a normal distribution) the number of men and women just below 
the maximum weight threshold (who could be pushed over the maximum by a small 
gain) is greater than the number just above the threshold (who could be pushed below 
the maximum by a small loss). 
 
VIII. Limitations 
The limitations of this paper include the following.  A recruit who fails to pass 
the weight-for-height and percent body fat standards can petition to be re-measured at 
a later date.  We are unable to determine which overweight and overfat subjects in our 
sample might have been able to “make weight” at a later date.  We estimate body fat 
using skinfold thicknesses at the tricep and subscapular regions, whereas the Army 
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uses the circumference of the abdomen and neck (U.S. Army, 2006); however, each is 
considered an accurate measure of body fat (Heymsfield et al., 2004).  We examine 
only the standards regarding weight-for-height and percent body fat, whereas many 
other factors, such as standardized test scores, criminal background check, and 
performance on tests of physical fitness determine whether a recruit is eligible for 
enlistment.  Thus, our estimates of the number of civilians that exceed the standards 
for weight-for-height and percent body fat are potentially much lower than the number 
that would fail any of the military’s enlistment criteria.  However, the purpose of this 
paper is not to estimate the number of civilians who fail any, or pass all, of the military 
enlistment standards, but to document how rising obesity disqualifies increasing 
numbers of civilians from military enlistment. 
 
IX. Discussion 
The high and rising prevalence of obesity represents a substantial challenge for 
military recruitment.  The percentage of civilian military-age men and women who 
exceed military enlistment standards for weight-for-height and percent body fat has 
risen considerably in the past five decades.  Between 1959-62 and 2007-08, the 
percentage of civilians aged 17-42 years who exceed the Army’s enlistment standards 
for weight and body fat more than doubled for men and tripled for women.  As of 
2007-08, there were 5.7 million men and 16.5 million women between the ages of 17 
and 42 who exceed the Army’s enlistment standards for weight and body fat.  As a 
result, the rise in obesity among the civilian population “may pose significant 
problems for national defense” (Yamane, 2007, p. 1163).   
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The implications of the rise in obesity for military recruitment depend in part 
on the number of military recruits needed in the future.  If the U.S. completes 
Operation New Dawn in Iraq and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, 
downsizes its military, and avoids large-scale wars, the impact will be less than if an 
additional major threat or conflict arises that requires a substantial expansion of the 
military, in which case rising obesity will represent a substantial obstacle to recruiting 
a sufficient number of high quality candidates, particularly among females. 
The problem would be particularly acute if the U.S. was forced by wartime 
demands to return to a system of conscription or draft that sought to enlist a high 
percentage of civilians.  Under conscription, military enlistment standards and 
exemptions can have the unintended consequence of incentivizing certain behaviors in 
order to avoid military service.  For example, the Vietnam-era draft, by exempting 
those who were attending college, increased college attendance by 4 to 6 percentage 
points (Card and Lemieux, 2001).  Another example from the Vietnam war is that a 
removal of the draft exemption for married childless men but retention of the 
exemption for married men with children led to a spike in fertility (Kutinova, 2009).  
Johnson (1997) contends that, historically, some potential draftees sought to gain 
weight to disqualify themselves from military service.  Yamane (2007) argues that the 
rise in weight in the civilian population implies that there is a large number of 
potential draftees for whom it would be relatively easy to intentionally gain a 
sufficient amount of weight to avoid military service.   
 The percentage of military-age civilians who exceed weight-for-height and 
body fat standards increased considerably more for women than men.  Although 
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women constitute the minority of each U.S. armed service, the percentages are 
nontrivial; women represent 6.2% of the Marine Corps, 13.4% of the Army, 14.8% of 
the Navy, and 19.4% of the Air Force (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).  However, that is 
subject to change.  When engaged in wars that are intense or long in duration, nations 
tend to enlist individuals previously thought less suited to service.  For example, prior 
to 1941, the U.S. military never seriously considered employing women to fly military 
planes.  That changed with the manpower demands of World War II, and in 1943 the 
U.S. formed the Women’s Airforce Service Pilots (WASPs), through which over 
1,000 American women flew military aircraft for noncombat purposes (Campbell, 
1996).  Today, several nations (e.g. Israel) require mandatory military service of 
women (Poast, 2006).  Future threats or conflicts could lead the U.S. to enlist large 
numbers of women in its armed forces.  Thus, rising obesity among women, not just 
that among men, represents a concern for national security. 
A simplistic response to the challenge presented by the rise in obesity is to 
relax the enlistment standards to allow heavier and fatter recruits into the military.  
However, high weight and body fat have been linked to worse job performance in 
military occupations (IOM, 1990, 2004; Naghii, 2006), and cost the military over $1.2 
billion annually in higher health care spending and lower productivity (Dall et al., 
2007).  The IOM reports that, of the recruits who exceeded the weight-for-height 
standards but subsequently entered the military because they passed the standards later 
or received a waiver, 80% left the military before completing their first term of 
enlistment but after the expenditure of training costs (IOM, 2004).  Thus, relaxing the 
standards could entail substantial costs.  It is beyond the scope of this study to 
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calculate the optimal weight standards for the military from a cost-benefit perspective, 
but that is an important direction for future research. 
 Our probit results indicate that in recent years (1999-2008), African American 
females are between 17.4 and 19.3 percentage points more likely than white females, 
and African-American males are roughly 3 percentage points more likely than white 
males, to exceed the weight and body fat standards of the Army.  These disparities 
represent a substantial challenge for the U.S. military, which actively seeks to recruit a 
labor force that is representative of the nation but has recently experienced declining 
enlistments by minorities, especially African-Americans (Asch et al., 2009).   
Collectively, the findings of this paper, and their implications for military 
recruitment, represent an underappreciated cost of the obesity epidemic, and thus 
represent an additional reason for the U.S. government to invest in prevention of 
obesity.  Cost-effective school-based interventions to prevent childhood obesity have 
been identified (Wang et al., 2003; Brown et al., 2007; Cawley, 2007, 2010).  In 
addition, the Federal and state governments can mandate that private health insurance 
plans cover cost-effective methods of preventing and treating youth obesity (Homer 
and Simpson, 2007; Cawley, 2010) and states can cover such treatments in their 
Medicaid programs.   
There is a precedent for concerns about military readiness leading to 
government policies to reduce obesity.  Singapore, which has universal male 
conscription, became concerned about rising obesity among military conscripts and in 
response implemented in 1992 a broad campaign to reduce youth obesity (Walsh, 
2004).  Even in the U.S. there is precedent for the military advocating policies to 
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ensure healthy weight among youths; the Mission: Readiness (2010) report notes that, 
after World War II, General Lewis Hershey, the Director of the Selective Service, 
convinced Congress to pass the National School Lunch Act “…as a way to improve 
the nutrition of America’s children, increase their height and weight, and ensure 
America’s national security” (Mission: Readiness, 2010, p. 1).  Ironically, the modern 
school lunch program has been identified as a contributing factor to childhood obesity 
(e.g., Schanzenbach, 2009).  As a result, retired generals and admirals are now calling 
for the removal of high-calorie, low-nutrient foods from schools and for improving the 
quality of the school lunch program (Mission: Readiness, 2010).  The need for 
effective obesity prevention is urgent, as our estimates indicate that an additional gain 
in weight and percent body fat of just 1% would disqualify an additional 853,000 men 
and 1.3 million women from serving in the Army. 
 The trends documented in this paper suggest that retaining already-fit members 
of the military may be increasingly cost-effective relative to recruiting civilians who 
satisfy military weight and body fat requirements.  A direction for future research is to 
examine whether cost effectiveness considerations justify shifting resources away 
from recruitment and toward retention. 
The trends documented in this paper also suggest that the military may need to 
increasingly engage in factor substitution.  As obesity raises the cost of recruiting an 
additional soldier who meets military weight requirements (and lowers the marginal 
product of military labor), it may be cost-saving to substitute capital for labor.  The 
military has recently engaged in such factor substitution, e.g. moving from manned to 
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unmanned aerial vehicles (e.g. Predator drones); additional substitution of capital for 
labor could help the military deal with a shrinking pool of high-quality recruits. 
Another possibility is to substitute one type of labor to another.  During the 
War on Terror, the U.S. military has increasingly outsourced activities to private 
military companies, which can recruit from a broader, international, labor pool 
(Singer, 2003).  Though perhaps repugnant to some (Roth, 2007), such outsourcing of 
military functions could alleviate the burden on the U.S. military to find a large 
number of fit military recruits. 
An ongoing challenge for the military is how to accurately measure fitness for 
service.  Initially the military used weight-for-height, in part because it is easy to 
assess, but it is a noisy measure of fatness (Burkhauser and Cawley, 2008), and had 
the undesirable consequence of excluding men with high muscle mass, so the military 
now admits applicants who exceed the weight-for-height standard as long as their 
percent body fat is under a certain threshold (Johnson, 1997).  Moreover, the services 
have varying standards of weight-for-height and body fat with no clearly articulated 
rationale based on difference of needs (NRC, 2006).  An important direction for future 
research is to determine the measure of fatness, and the enlistment standards based on 
that  measure of fatness, that are optimal for each service. 
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